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I. INTRODUCTION 
Public and private regimes of behavior regulation coexist, in varying 
degrees of harmony, in many aspects of life.1 Law, even under a narrow 
definition that excludes private regulatory regimes, known as Private 
Legal Systems (PLSs), must address the degree of accommodation public 
regulatory regimes will afford their private counterparts. Some fields of 
law—most notably contract and property law—enforce forms of private 
 1. The term “regulation” has a variety of definitions, some so broad as to encompass any 
constraint that limits free choice and others so narrow as to relate only to government activity that 
mandates consumer prices to firms in certain industries. Broadly speaking, regulation includes the 
creation of norms, detection of violations of those norms, and enforcement of the norms on the 
detected violators. To focus the discussion in this Article, the term “regulation” will be used to mean 
activity (by any institution or individual) aimed at enforcing norms. Often, regulation is facilitated 
through intervention of an entity other than the party that is potentially harmed by the violation of 
the norm. However, one form of regulation (which this Article will refer to as transaction regulation) 
involves mechanisms implemented by parties to the transaction with the intent to protect against 
violations of norms that regard the transaction. For example, forming long-term relationships with 
certain parties and abstaining from contracting with others would be considered a form of transaction 
regulation. Another form of regulation (referred to as self-regulation) involves self-restraint by the 
would-be norm violator. Regulation therefore spans a wide range of forms, from self-regulation by 
the potential norm violator, through parties that are potentially harmed by the violation of the norm 
and third-party “gatekeepers” that work on their behalf (see infra text accompanying note 29), to 
regulation by networks and, finally, to regulation by government. 
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regulation that are perceived as beneficial. Other fields of law—antitrust 
law in particular—prohibit forms of private regulation that are perceived 
as harmful. 
Still other fields of law do not directly address private regulation, but 
may be designed in ways that either facilitate or hinder coexistence of 
public and private law in a given area. For example, imposing liability on 
private institutions that unknowingly facilitate illegal activity assists in 
preventing the illegal activity, but imposes an additional cost on the 
private entities. This issue has received much attention recently in 
connection with the media industry’s attempt to impose liability for 
copyright violations on peer-to-peer exchanges (notably, Napster),2 as 
well as regulators’ attempts to impose liability on online payment 
systems that facilitate illegal gambling.3 This liability may deter some 
efficient private schemes. The result may or may not be socially 
beneficial depending on the social benefits from the private scheme and 
their relative advantage or disadvantage over public counterparts. 
The legal scholarship known as “private ordering” serves these 
bodies of law by assessing the social benefits and relative advantages of 
PLSs. In analyzing private institutions, this literature emphasizes two 
elements that are used to regulate or enforce norms:4 repeated play and 
 2. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that 
record companies and movie publishers made a prima facie case of copyright infringement against 
Napster, a peer-to-peer system for online exchange of files); Ellison v. Robertson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 
1051 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that the posting of copyrighted material on an America Online 
USENET newsgroup comes within the scope of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s safe-harbor 
provision for “intermediate and transient storage”). 
 3. See, e.g., PayPal Inc. to Stop Processing Payments from New Yorkers, WALL ST. J., Aug. 
22, 2002, at B8 (discussing the New York Attorney General’s investigation of PayPal, Inc., an online 
payment system, for its involvement in processing payments related to online gambling activities). 
 4. Scholars offer a variety of definitions of the term “norms.” See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, 
Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law 
Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1656–57 (1996) (defining norms as obligations); Melvin A. 
Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1255 (1999) (defining 
norms as “all rules and regularities concerning human conduct, other than legal rules and 
organizational rules”); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 
96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 340 (1997) (defining norms as “informal social regularities that individuals 
feel obligated to follow because of an internalized sense of duty, because of a fear of external non-
legal sanctions, or both”); Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1697, 1699–1701 (1996) (defining norms as rules that distinguish desirable and undesirable 
behavior while giving a third party the authority to punish those engaging in undesirable behavior); 
Lior J. Strahilevitz, Social Norms from Close-Knit Groups to Loose-Knit Groups, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 
359, 363 n.24 (defining norms as “behavioral regularities that arise when humans are interacting 
with each other, regardless of whether that interaction is face-to-face”); Cass R. Sunstein, Social 
Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 914 (1996) (using a rough definition of norms as 
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reputation. This Article discusses a third element: network effects. 
Network effects (or network benefits) are demand-side economies of 
scale—the phenomenon that the utility to a user of a good or service 
increases as additional people use it.5 Often, though not always, 
realization of network effects requires interconnection between the users. 
The institution that facilitates interconnection between users of a good or 
service exhibiting network effects, thus enabling the realization of 
network benefits, is called a network. 
While a significant literature exists on the economics of network 
effects and some scholars have discussed the application of network 
effects in legal analysis,6 the private-ordering literature has for the most 
part ignored the implications of network effects. This is a significant 
shortcoming because the vast majority of PLSs examined in the literature 
are networks, such as exchanges, merchant coalitions, and social circles. 
This Article will explore the implications of network effects on the 
ability and relative advantage of private institutions to regulate. While 
the analysis in this Article is applicable to the enforcement of any norm, 
the Article will focus on regulation as the mitigation of opportunistic 
behavior in transactions. The Article presents three insights on private 
ordering that are better understood through a network-effects analysis. 
First, network effects make certain mechanisms far more effective in 
enforcing norms. The Article classifies four such mechanisms commonly 
used by networks and assesses in which market structures they will be 
most effective. Second, network effects allow a certain type of 
opportunistic behavior (which this Article, following recent economic 
“social attitudes of approval and disapproval, specifying what ought to be done and what ought not 
to be done”). Since this Article examines a spectrum of regulators (i.e., norm enforcers) that 
encompasses government as well as private actors and since the same “norm” may be enforced by 
one of several regulators depending, among other things, on the relative efficiency of each regulator 
in enforcing the specific norm, it is not sensible for this Article to use a definition that is based on 
the identity of the regulator (i.e., it is not sensible to call something a norm if a private actor enforces 
it but not if a government actor does). Therefore, this Article will take a very broad definition of 
norms, to include all rules and regularities concerning human conduct (including legal and 
organizational rules). 
 5. See discussion infra Part III.A.1. 
 6. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 245–56 
(2d ed. 2001) (analyzing exclusionary practices in the “new economy,” which is characterized by 
significant network effects); David A. Balto, Networks and Exclusivity: Antitrust Analysis to 
Promote Network Competition, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 523 (1999); Mark A. Lemley & David 
McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1998). 
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literature, calls “degradation”)7 that is not feasible to the opportunistic 
party in nonnetwork environments. Some norm-enforcing mechanisms 
that are commonly used against “garden-variety” opportunism are 
ineffective against degradation, making a regulator whose strengths lie in 
these mechanisms less efficient in enforcing norms if degradation is 
likely to occur. Third, networks are dynamic entities that evolve and 
change their form to seize opportunities that increase the networks’ 
benefit to their members, such as increasing their ability or incentive to 
regulate.8 The Article examines one such important dynamic:9 the ability 
of networks to modify themselves so as to become more effective 
regulators when the existing network has the ability to regulate 
efficiently but not the incentive to do so.10
Part II of this Article examines regulation (i.e., norm-enforcing) in 
general. This part will introduce the reader to the problem that a 
regulator will face (opportunism), to the institutions that attempt to 
mitigate this problem, and to the elements that facilitate private ordering: 
repeated play, reputation, and network effects. Part III then looks in 
depth at how network effects influence regulation. It explains the nature 
and characteristics of network effects and then analyzes how network 
effects enhance the ability to regulate on one hand, yet create new and 
more powerful forms of opportunism on the other hand. On the 
regulation-enhancing side, four types of mechanisms used by networks to 
regulate are classified and discussed. On the opportunism-enhancing 
side, a network-effects-driven type of opportunism called degradation is 
explained and distinguished from the type of opportunism commonly 
addressed in the private-ordering literature, which this Article calls 
“breach.” The Article then examines the relationship between market 
structure and the prevalent type of opportunism and touches briefly on 
 7. Degradation is a predatory act that weakens the network, harming smaller firms more 
than larger ones, thereby giving larger firms an advantage over smaller competitors. This concept is 
discussed in depth infra Part III.C.2. 
 8. For example, several networks may connect into a “network of networks,” merging the 
networks into a single, larger network. 
 9. For a broader exploration of the patterns of evolution of PLSs (and in particular networks 
serving as PLSs), see Amitai Aviram, The Paradox of Spontaneous Formation of Private Legal 
Systems, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript on file with the author). An 
earlier, working-paper version of the article is available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=391780. 
 10. Such modified networks have been observed and discussed in antitrust scholarship, where 
they have been called “middleware,” but have yet to receive significant attention from the private-
ordering literature. 
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the relevant effects of opportunism of either type on social welfare.11 
Part IV explores the circumstances in which networks are the most 
efficient regulators. There is an implicit (and sometimes explicit) 
competition between several regulatory regimes: government regulation, 
network regulation (i.e., enforcement by networks), transaction 
regulation (i.e., enforcement by the specific parties to any given 
transaction), and self-regulation (i.e., self-restraint driven by morality). 
Building on the analysis set forth in Part III regarding types of 
opportunism and types of opportunism-mitigating mechanisms, this 
Article predicts each regulator’s relative advantage in enforcing norms 
based, inter alia, on the prevailing market structure. The regulator with 
the best ability and incentive to enforce norms in given circumstances is 
likely to win the “competition” between potential regulators and enforce 
norms in that segment of human activity. Finally, Part V summarizes and 
concludes. 
This Article offers but an initial observation of the implications of 
network effects on private ordering. The analysis offered in this Article 
provides guidelines to future detailed empirical examination of the 
utilization of network effects in creating institutions that enforce norms. 
II. REGULATION, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
A. Opportunism 
Opportunistic default on obligations12 is an inherent risk in any 
transaction between parties lacking complete control over each other’s 
actions.13 Such behavior harms the parties to the transaction by reducing 
 11. For a definition of social welfare, see infra Part III.C.4. 
 12. Opportunism may be defined as “an act in which someone destroys part of the 
cooperative surplus to secure a larger share of it.” Robert D. Cooter, The Theory of Market 
Modernization of Law, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 141, 150 (1996). For other general definitions of 
opportunism, see OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, 
MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 47 (1985) (defining opportunism as “self-interest seeking 
with guile”); Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. REV. 789, 834 
(2002) (defining opportunism as “bad faith exploitation of uncertainty”). In the context of contract 
law, opportunism has been defined as a situation in which one party “behaves contrary to the other 
party’s understanding of their contract, but not necessarily contrary to the agreement’s explicit 
terms, leading to a transfer of wealth from the other party.” Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic 
Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521, 521 (1981). 
 13. This statement assumes that there is no anti-opportunism regulation of the transaction 
(e.g., enforceable contract law). If such regulation exists, the statement would still be true where the 
regulating regime has weaknesses or, in the case of contract law, where the contract is incomplete. 
AVI-FIN--NAME FIXED.DOC 2/18/2004 1:26:36 PM 
1179] Regulation by Networks 
 1185 
 
the return on any investments they made in reliance on the defaulted 
obligations. Since the devaluation of the reliance investments of injured 
parties does not harm the defaulting party, the latter might choose to 
default absent some adverse sanction to such behavior, even when this 
results in a decrease in the combined welfare of all parties to the 
transaction. The devaluation of reliance investments is thus a negative 
externality imposed by opportunistic default on an obligation.14 
Furthermore, recognizing the risk of default, parties to a transaction may 
decide to invest less in reliance on the transaction than they would have 
if opportunistic default had been less probable or less damaging; this 
lower investment might result in lower utility from the transaction. 
Both lowering the probability of opportunistic default on obligations 
and decreasing the damage caused by such default increase the welfare 
of potential parties to transactions. For that reason, potential parties to a 
transaction seek forms of regulation that would achieve either or both 
reduced probability and reduced damage from opportunistic default. 
Different entities have different advantages and disadvantages as 
regulators, and overlapping regulation by different entities may 
complement or conflict with regulation by other entities. 
B. Classifying Regulators 
Robert Ellickson identified, in his seminal book Order Without Law, 
five categories of regulators (which he calls “controllers”): first-party 
controllers, second-party controllers, and three types of third-party 
 14. One may raise a “Coasian” argument that the negative externality of opportunism is 
internalized by a decrease in the price buyers would be willing to pay in a transaction that is 
vulnerable to opportunistic behavior. For example, if Abe knows that Ben may act opportunistically 
and reduce Abe’s benefits from the transaction by $2, Abe will be willing to pay Ben $2 less, 
making him no worse and Ben no better by the opportunistic behavior. Of course, in that situation all 
potential opportunists would have an incentive to act opportunistically (unless they can identify 
themselves as nonopportunists) since they are already penalized by the buyer and so might as well 
recoup the penalty by benefiting from opportunistic behavior. For example, Carol, who is also a 
seller, might have considered not acting opportunistically towards Abe, but since Abe pays $2 less 
than market price (assuming the worst of the seller’s behavior), Carol can only compete with Ben if 
she too earns back the $2 by acting opportunistically. This equilibrium, in which all potential 
opportunistic parties choose to act opportunistically while all injured parties reduce price and 
reliance, is inefficient because it precludes efficient investments that rely on the fair execution of the 
transaction. Regulators, by mitigating opportunism, allow either direct deterrence of opportunistic 
behavior or differentiation between opportunistic parties and nonopportunistic parties enabling Abe 
to offer a higher price to honest Carol than to opportunistic Ben, thus indirectly deterring Ben from 
acting opportunistically. 
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controllers—informal controllers (social forces), non-governmental 
organization controllers, and government controllers (the legal system).15
1. Self-regulation 
First-party regulation, or self-regulation,16 gives the role of regulator 
to the entity with the greatest ability to both detect and prevent norm 
violation—the potential norm violator herself. However, this person has 
the least incentive to regulate, as she is typically the primary beneficiary 
of the opportunistic behavior. Furthermore, this form of regulation is 
highly vulnerable to self-deception (i.e., the would-be norm violator may 
interpret norms so as not to conflict with desired, self-serving behavior). 
Finally, self-control is vulnerable to differences in culture or personal 
morality—actions that are morally repugnant to one person may be 
acceptable to another, and so one person’s expectations of another’s self-
control may be frustrated even in the absence of self-deception. 
2. Transaction regulation 
In the context of norms applying to personal interactions or business 
transactions (as do most norms), the regulators next in proximity to the 
norm violator are the other parties to the transaction. Regulation by the 
parties to the transaction, referred to by Ellickson as “second-party 
controllers,”17 may also be referred to as transaction regulation. 
Transaction regulation includes relationship-building measures, such as 
bilateral bonds18 or integration,19 and the use of third-party guarantors,20 
etc. 
Second-party control presents a different set of advantages and 
disadvantages. The second party has an unbiased incentive to prevent 
 15. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 
126–32, 241–46 (1991). 
 16. The term self-regulation is frequently used to describe all forms of nongovernment 
regulation. This Article, however, differentiates between the various types of nongovernment 
regulation: self-regulation (facilitated by first-party controllers, in Ellickson’s terms), transaction 
regulation (facilitated by second-party controllers), and network regulation (facilitated by informal 
and organizational controllers). 
 17. See ELLICKSON, supra note 15, at 130–32, 246–48. 
 18. See, e.g., Rachel E. Kranton, The Formation of Cooperative Relationships, 12 J.L. ECON. 
& ORG. 214 (1996). 
 19. See, e.g., Andy C.M. Chen & Keith N. Hylton, Procompetitive Theories of Vertical 
Control, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 573, 590–91 (1999). 
 20. See Avery Wiener Katz, An Economic Analysis of the Guaranty Contract, 66 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 47 (1999). 
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opportunistic default on obligations to the extent that the opportunism is 
at its expense,21 and it also possesses intimate knowledge of the 
transaction’s subject matter (e.g., the industry in which it operates). 
However, its ability to punish opportunism is limited since, absent 
coordination with or assistance from others, it can only deprive the 
defaulting party of their future mutual transactions.22 If the value of such 
transactions is not great,23 this sanction may fail to deter some 
opportunistic behavior. 
3. Government regulation 
Third-party controllers include the government and PLSs (which 
Ellickson further classifies into informal controllers and organization 
controllers).24 Government is a natural candidate for regulating 
opportunism in transacting. Having a monopoly on violence and 
controlling specialized enforcement agencies that can enforce 
injunctions, fines, and damages awards, the government can impose 
unique sanctions such as incarceration25 and has a greater ability to 
impose fines than do most other potential regulators. Unsurprisingly, 
therefore, government enforcement has a significant role in regulating; so 
great a role, in fact, that many view it as the sole, or at least the primary, 
 21. Some parties may enter a transaction with the intent to defraud and therefore would not 
have an interest in preventing opportunism at any stage. However, if a mechanism were available to 
prevent opportunism, the refusal of a party to implement it would signal to other parties a likely 
intent to defraud. Therefore, at least ex ante, parties to a transaction are likely to agree to implement 
mechanisms mitigating opportunism. 
 22. This statement assumes that the agreements between the first and second parties are 
enforced by the promisee. If they are enforced by government through private actions (e.g., if the 
promisee sues in court to enforce the agreement), then the form of regulation is a hybrid in which 
detection of deviation from the norm is done primarily by the second-party controller while 
formation of the norm and enforcement against violations are done by the government. Thus, it 
would not be a pure form of second-party regulation. 
 23. For example, the value of future transactions would not be great if the defaulting party 
were able to transact with other, similarly attractive firms. 
 24. See ELLICKSON, supra note 15, at 130–32. Both informal controllers and organization 
controllers are typically (but not always) networks and make use of network effects to enforce 
norms. Therefore, this Article does not make the distinction between these two types of network-
based PLSs. 
 25. Despite government’s ability to punish by incarceration, only the most severe norm 
violations are punishable by incarceration. Not all violations of norms are criminal; some give rise 
only to civil sanctions and others allow no legal cause of action at all. Even among criminal norm 
violations, very often the offender is sentenced to a fine rather than imprisonment. The criminal 
system deals with many forms of harmful behavior, varying in their degree of harm to society. Since 
sanctions are determined in proportion to the severity of the crime, the most deterring of government 
sanctions are not used against most common norm violations. 
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method of regulation. Contract law is intended to lend the power of the 
government’s enforcement machinery to parties injured by breach of 
obligations. Commercial law provides more specific rules for certain 
common types of commercial transactions intended, among other 
reasons, to curb opportunistic frustration of the goals of those 
transactions.26 Consumer protection law is, to a significant degree, aimed 
at correcting information asymmetries that make opportunistic behavior 
more likely.27 Antitrust law similarly addresses opportunism that is 
caused by the possession or attempted acquisition of market power.28 
Industry-specific regulation often monitors and remedies opportunism by 
or against the firms it regulates. 
Because the government, compared to other potential regulators, is 
usually the most distant from the norm violator, it has significant 
monitoring costs and costs of error. The government may attempt to 
reduce monitoring costs either by creating a specialized regulator or, 
more commonly, by allowing private rights of action (which utilize the 
lower monitoring costs of transaction regulation and, after verification by 
a court or agency, allow the use of the government’s sanctions). 
Both techniques suffer from significant flaws. Regulators are very 
expensive, are subject to capture, and have greater monitoring costs, 
even under optimal conditions, than the parties to the transaction. Private 
rights of action are subject to abuse since regardless of their merit they 
impose costs (legal, reputational, temporal, etc.) on the defendant and 
therefore may be manipulated by a plaintiff to extract a payoff from the 
defendant. Furthermore, the governmental verification system, usually a 
trial before a court, is imperfect as judges often lack the information, 
expertise, or time to properly verify suits. 
 26. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Law and Economic Growth, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1737, 1749–50 
(2002) (“The law also provides a benefit by providing default rules and monitoring for opportunism, 
which efficiently reduces the ex ante precautions that have to be taken by contracting parties.”). 
 27. See, e.g., Purity Supreme, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 407 N.E.2d 297, 306–07 (Mass. 1980) 
(“The overall purpose of [the Massachusetts statute regulating business practices for consumer 
protection] is that of ‘providing proper disclosure of information and a more equitable balance in the 
relationship of consumers to persons conducting business activities.’”). Removing information 
asymmetries and thus creating an “equitable balance” between the transacting parties requires not 
only the provision of information (i.e., disclosure), but also the necessary analytical tools to assess 
this information which depend on the sophistication of the consumer. 
 28. See, e.g., Digital Equip. Corp. v. Uniq Digital Techs., Inc., 73 F.3d 756, 762 (7th Cir. 
1996) (distinguishing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992)). 
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4. Network regulation 
Third parties other than the government are also enlisted as 
regulators if they have relative advantages over the parties to the 
transaction and the government. For example, investment banks, 
accountants, law firms, and other financial intermediaries often serve as 
“gatekeepers,” since they have advantageous access to information 
regarding potential opportunism.29 While gatekeepers are third parties, 
regulation through them may be considered more in line with Ellickson’s 
classification of second-party control if the gatekeepers’ role is limited to 
providing informational and other services to the second party, but the 
actual enforcement is done by the second party primarily through 
refusing to deal with the opportunistic party. In such cases, the 
gatekeeper is not a controller but merely a provider of a service that is 
used by the second party to regulate. 
In contrast, other third parties, such as exchanges and trade 
associations, create, adjudicate, and enforce norms that are intended to 
reduce opportunism.30 Typically, such third parties not only enjoy 
potential informational advantages, but are also able to impose sanctions 
against offenders that may rival or surpass the government’s sanctions in 
their effectiveness, thus deterring opportunism and hence decreasing its 
likelihood. Furthermore, the same third parties are also able to replace 
defaulted transactions with substitute transactions more efficiently than 
the parties to the transaction themselves, thus mitigating the damages 
from default. These third parties are networks, and their efforts to 
enforce norms are network regulation.31
 29. See Stephen J. Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 916 (1998); 
Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 53, 54 (1986); Ronald J. Mann, Verification Institutions in Financing Transactions, 
87 GEO. L.J. 2225 (1999). 
 30. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual 
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) [hereinafter Bernstein, Opting 
Out]; Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 108 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) [hereinafter Bernstein, Private 
Commercial Law]. 
 31. For a discussion of network effects, see infra Part III.A. Ellickson differentiates between 
two controllers—informal controllers and organizational controllers—both of which are usually 
networks. See ELLICKSON, supra note 15, at 130–32. The difference between these two types of 
controllers is mainly in the array of enforcement mechanisms they wield. Informal controllers make 
use of information and switching mechanisms, while organizational controllers make use of these 
two mechanisms and also of exclusion and control mechanisms. These mechanisms will be 
explained infra Part III.B. There may be some exceptions in which a specific informal or 
organizational controller would not be a network. But as explained infra Parts IV.B and IV.C, in 
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Networks appear in many forms: trade associations, commodity 
exchanges, electricity grids, internet auction sites, and peer-to-peer and 
business-to-business exchanges.32 In most cases, networks do not exist 
solely to regulate. Rather, they exist primarily to exploit network effects 
and thus increase members’ utility from transacting. This Article does 
not attempt to explain networks in general, but rather focuses on 
networks as regulators. In certain circumstances, networks are better 
regulators than the parties to the transaction or other third parties such as 
the government. In such cases, networks will not only facilitate 
transactions, but also act as regulators. Anti-opportunism mechanisms 
instituted by the network may displace counterpart measures applied by 
other regulators (e.g., government regulation, bilateral contracting, etc.). 
Identifying these circumstances and the mechanisms used by networks to 
combat opportunism is a goal of this Article. 
5. Interaction between multiple regulators 
Regulation by one regulator does not necessarily exclude other 
regulators. Very often each regulator regulates those aspects in which it 
is most efficient, relying upon another for regulation of other aspects. 
The prospect of being regulated by a default, less efficient regulator may 
even serve as an incentive to adhere to the more efficient regulator. For 
example, transaction regulation very often operates “in the shadow of the 
law,” efficiently mitigating opportunism in transactions with lower value 
while relying on the ability to sue in court to mitigate opportunism in 
higher-value transactions in which the costs and delays of the 
government regulation do not dissipate most of the value of the 
dispute.33
However, to a certain extent, each regulator’s activity may weaken 
another regulator’s ability to regulate. Self-regulation (i.e., morality and 
many circumstances networks tend to have an advantage in regulating over nonnetwork third-party 
controllers, and therefore nonnetwork third-party controllers tend to be uncommon. 
 32. Examples of business environments significantly influenced by networks include 
exchanges (securities exchanges, commodity exchanges, etc.); financial networks (credit card 
networks, ATM networks, check clearance, etc.); communications (long distance and international 
telephony, cellular telephony, internet backbone services, etc.); transportation (air, sea, and land 
transportation); mail and express services (domestic and international); and energy networks 
(electricity, gas and oil pipelines). 
 33. See, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the 
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979) (noting that private resolution of disputes 
receives a powerful incentive from “the outcome that the law will impose if no agreement is 
needed”). 
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self-control) may be more lax in a strict environment that is rife with 
rules enforced by other regulators. For example, one may obey the 
externally enforced rules but not exercise significant self-restraint in 
matters not prohibited by the rules.34 Network regulation is often biased 
by the existence of government regulation because regulated parties’ 
activities may be aimed at either appeasing the government regulator or 
“capturing” it, either of which may diverge from the course of action 
needed to efficiently mitigate opportunism. Where government 
regulation is more efficient but the government lacks the means to 
enforce its regulation, as is the case in some developing countries and 
occasionally in certain areas of developed countries, network regulation 
that substitutes for government law enforcement becomes redundant 
when the government increases enforcement.35 Likewise, network 
regulation can reduce the effectiveness of transaction regulation by 
decreasing the quality of partners to bilateral contracting who remain 
outside the network.36 The converse is also true—transaction regulation 
may reduce the effectiveness of network regulation by diverting 
transactions away from the network, thereby decreasing the effectiveness 
of the network’s enforcement mechanisms.37
C. Elements that Facilitate Private Ordering 
The literature on private ordering examines regulation by parties 
other than government: rules, norms, and institutions that are self-
imposed by private parties (or evolve)38 to govern their behavior and 
 34. On the weakening of corporate morality as a result of increased rule-based regulation, see 
Lawrence E. Mitchell, Cooperation and Constraint in the Modern Corporation: An Inquiry into the 
Causes of Corporate Immorality, 73 TEX. L. REV. 477 (1995). 
 35. See John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public 
Order, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2421, 2445 (2000) (“Private order can serve as either a complement to or a 
substitute for public order . . . . An improvement in the law will increase the use of complementary 
private-order mechanisms; it will similarly decrease the use of substituting private-order 
mechanisms.”); Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, The Dark Side of Private Ordering: An 
Institutional and Empirical Analysis of Organized Crime, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 91–97 (2000) 
(discussing the effectiveness of public enforcement of property rights, rather than public 
enforcement of criminal law, in reducing organized crime, which is a PLS). 
 36. See Raja Kali, Endogenous Business Networks, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 615, 629 (1999). 
 37. This Article will explain what the network’s specific enforcement mechanisms are infra 
Part III.B. Transaction regulation reduces the effectiveness of the exclusion and switching 
mechanisms due to a decrease in network benefits, and of the control and information mechanisms 
due to lack of network control over the bilateral transactions. 
 38. Some norms are not contemplated and imposed, but evolve. See Posner, supra note 4, at 
1699 (“The rule-like nature of a norm should not disguise the fact that norms are not enacted and 
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transactions.39 Macaulay’s seminal work in this field observed that few 
contractual disputes are litigated and most are settled without resorting to 
government-enforced laws.40 Subsequent research pointed out two 
advantages in mitigating opportunism that certain nongovernment 
institutions may possess. In analyzing the institutions that mitigate 
opportunism, the private-ordering literature emphasizes two elements: 
repeated play and reputation. 
1. Repeated play 
The repeated-play element addresses the perception of the parties to 
a transaction that they are likely to transact again in the future. As a 
result of this perception, each party’s behavior in the current transaction 
may have consequences in future transactions.41 For example, if John 
promises to buy Dan’s car but then reneges on that promise, Dan may 
refuse to transact with John in the future or may deal with John in the 
future under terms less favorable to John, both as a punishment and 
because Dan now takes into account the greater likelihood of John’s 
defaulting again. Knowing these are the likely consequences, John will 
be hesitant to renege on his promise in the first place, at least if he 
anticipates that the cost of losing future transactions with Dan will be 
greater than the benefit from reneging on the current promise. 
enforced like statutes. It is more plausible to say that when people observe some behavior, they more 
or less spontaneously approve or disapprove of it (or fail to react), and then reward, penalize, or 
ignore the actor.”). 
 39. See, e.g., Stuart Banner, The Origin of the New York Stock Exchange, 1791–1860, 27 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 113 (1998); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating 
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001); Robert C. 
Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the Whaling Industry, 5 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 83 (1989); Milhaupt & West, supra note 35. 
 40. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. 
SOC. REV. 55, 61 (1963). 
 41. See David M. Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in PERSPECTIVES ON 
POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 100–06 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle eds., 1990); Marleen 
A. O’Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-
Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 927 (1993) (“Economists suggest, however, 
that repeated play of a noncooperative game usually produces results similar to those achieved under 
a cooperative game in which such commitments are possible. Specifically, repetition allows the 
implicit agreement to refrain from opportunism to become self-enforcing because each player 
recognizes that the decision to defect in any round of play will trigger a similar response from the 
other player in the next round. The combination of the fear of retaliation for defecting and the 
prospect of future benefits from cooperating may cause the players to reach a mutually beneficial 
solution. Once the players make the initial move to cooperate, a ‘lock-in’ effect arises that promotes 
a pattern of collaboration through the game.”). 
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2. Reputation 
Reputation expands the scope of future consequences, by enabling 
other firms that were not parties to a given transaction to learn of the 
trustworthiness of the parties to that transaction and to act on that 
knowledge.42 Returning to the above example, John might realize that 
not only will reneging on his promise to Dan cause Dan to transact with 
him less favorably in the future, but John may also expect similar 
treatment from anyone who learns of his default. This reaction has 
nothing to do with sympathy for Dan—it is in the best interest of each 
person to be averse to dealing with another person who is likely to 
default on promises. A credible account of past behavior (i.e., reputation) 
is usually perceived as a good proxy for assessing the likelihood of future 
default on obligations. A party’s reputation therefore interests third 
parties and affects their disposition towards the person whose reputation 
they are aware of. 
3. Network effects 
This Article discusses a third element that affects the analysis of 
opportunism-mitigating institutions—network effects. Private-ordering 
scholarship has examined business environments that are dominated by 
networks, such as merchant coalitions43 and commodity and financial 
exchanges.44 It has also noted the use of social networks to combat 
opportunism in business transactions.45 However, it rarely distinguishes 
between institutions that are networks (that is, institutions characterized 
by network effects) and those that are not.46 As a result, the literature 
 42. See, e.g., David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. 
REV. 373, 409–20 (1990); Kreps, supra note 41, at 106–08. 
 43. See Karen Clay, Trade Without Law: Private-Order Institutions in Mexican California, 
13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 202 (1997); Avner Greif, Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions 
in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 525 (1993). 
 44. See, e.g., Banner, supra note 39; Bernstein, supra note 39; Stephen Craig Pirrong, The 
Efficient Scope of Private Transactions-Cost-Reducing Institutions: The Successes and Failures of 
Commodity Exchanges, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 229 (1995); Mark D. West, Private Ordering at the 
World’s First Futures Exchange, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2574 (2000). 
 45. See, e.g., Janet T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group: 
An Institutional Alternative to Contract Law, 10 J. LEG. STUD. 349 (1981). See also Bernstein, 
Private Commercial Law, supra note 30, at 110; Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 30, at 130; Kali, 
supra note 36. 
 46. Some of the literature does make relevant distinctions. For example, McMillan and 
Woodruff distinguish between “bilateral relational contracting” and “multilateral relational 
contracting.” See McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 35, at 2430–35. Not all multilateral contracts 
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usually discusses only types of opportunism that are common to both 
network and nonnetwork business environments47 and primarily 
examines regulation mechanisms that are common to both of these 
environments.48
Below, this Article examines how transacting in a network 
environment involves both unique risks of opportunism and unique, or at 
least in many circumstances significantly superior, abilities to regulate 
against opportunism. The next section begins this analysis by examining 
the relevant characteristics of networks. 
III. REGULATING IN A NETWORK ENVIRONMENT 
A. Network Effects 
1. What are network effects? 
While networks may enjoy economies of scale and scope in 
production, the unique quality of a network is economies of scale and 
scope in demand. Economists refer to this phenomenon as “network 
effects”: the value of membership in a network is enhanced by an 
increase in the number of other members or in the other members’ usage 
of the network.49 An example is an internet marketplace, such as eBay. If 
I want to sell an item, the probability that I will find a potential buyer 
increases as more people use the same internet marketplace. And as a 
are necessarily associated with networks. However, most of the multilateral contracts examined in 
the literature relate to networks, probably due to the advantages that a network possesses (over other 
multilateral institutions) in regulating. 
 47. Typically, the private-ordering literature examines opportunism of the type this Article 
defines as “breach” infra Part III.C.1. Transacting in network environments may also risk a 
markedly different type of opportunism which this Article defines as “degradation” infra Part 
III.C.2. 
 48. For example, as mentioned above, the literature emphasizes the role of reputation in 
restraining opportunism. Networks may be able to exploit economies of scale and solve collective 
action problems in monitoring reputation (see discussion on the information mechanism infra Part 
III.B.1), but they also have other opportunism-reducing mechanisms in their arsenal, including the 
ability to coordinate among the network members so that the opportunistic party faces a collective 
sanction from all members. Some scholars have addressed the need for coordination. See, e.g., 
McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 35, at 2439 (“Providing information about those who cheat may 
not suffice to deter cheating when punishment is costly—coordination may be required . . . .”). 
However, they have not focused on the connection between network effects and the effectiveness of 
coordinating mechanisms. 
 49. See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network 
Externalities, 94 J. POL. ECON. 822, 824 (1986). 
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buyer, the probability that I will find a person wishing to sell the very 
item I seek likewise increases as more people use the marketplace. 
In industries characterized by economies of scale in supply, firms 
lower their production costs by drawing more demand for their product, 
allowing them to produce more of the product and thus benefit from the 
economies of scale. But in network industries, firms can lower their 
costs,50 without having to wrest customers from their competitors, by 
interconnecting with competitors (i.e., making their product or service 
compatible with the competitors’), thus allowing each firm’s customers 
to reap demand-side economies of scale as if the customers of that firm’s 
competitors were its own.51 As Richard Posner notes, “[E]conomies of 
consumption presuppose uniformity rather than a common source.”52
For example, the benefits to customers of a cellular telephone 
company increase as customers are able to talk to more people with their 
phones. A cellular telephone carrier could, by interconnecting with 
another carrier, offer its customers the added benefits of talking with the 
other carrier’s customers, making each carrier’s service as attractive as if 
one of the carriers acquired all of the other’s customers. This 
characteristic of network industries creates a significant incentive for 
 50. Alternatively, firms can increase the consumer’s benefit from its products without 
increasing costs, which is equivalent to lowering costs. 
 51. Compare the following two situations. First, Acme Corp. and Ajax Corp. are rival steel 
producers. Steel is produced most cheaply when the output is at least 60 tons. This is a normal, 
supply-side economy of scale. The total demand for steel from all customers is 100 tons. Both Acme 
and Ajax vie to get orders for 60 tons of steel, but only one of them can reach that goal since if one 
has orders for 60 tons, other customers demand only 40 additional tons. If Acme succeeds in 
receiving orders for 60 tons of steel, its production costs will be lower than Ajax’s, and (assuming 
production costs don’t rise again for production above 60 tons) it would then be able to undercut 
Ajax’s prices and receive orders for the remaining 40 tons, driving Ajax out of business. Since both 
Acme and Ajax know that the competition for the first 60 tons determines which of them will 
survive, both would expend significant resources in defeating the other. 
Contrast that situation with the second situation: Acme and Ajax are rival telephone 
companies, and their networks are connected so that an Acme customer can call an Ajax customer 
and vice versa. Telephone service provides peak utility to the customers when it connects at least 60 
people. This is a network effect—a demand-side economy of scale. There are only 100 people in the 
territory Acme and Ajax operate in. If each has at least 30 customers, then each firm’s telephone 
network is connected to 60 people and provides peak utility. While each company might want to 
expand its business by taking its rival’s customers, it is not a survival contest. If the connection 
between customers of the two firms is of the same quality as the connection between customers of 
the same firm, then both firms would offer the same utility to their users regardless of differences in 
the number of customers each firm has. 
 52. POSNER, supra note 6, at 248. 
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creating interfirm networks.53 It also makes membership in a large 
network (i.e., the ability to transact through the network) a valuable 
asset.54 The network’s ability to exclude a member may therefore be a 
powerful sanction.55
Economists categorize network effects into two types: direct and 
indirect. Direct network effects are “generated through a direct physical 
effect of the number of purchasers on the value of a product.”56 For 
example, a telephone network derives its network effects directly from 
the ability of each user to communicate with each of the other users.57 
Indirect network effects, in contrast, are observed when the value of a 
product increases as a result of an increase in the purchase or use of a 
complementary product. For example, if more people use Excel, there 
will be more people any given user can obtain help from and more books 
and courses on how to use Excel; if more people carry MasterCards, 
more merchants will take MasterCards, making the cards more valuable 
to both cardholders and merchants.58
The concept of network effects is not at all a novel one. Perhaps the 
most ancient example of recognition of the enhanced benefits that result 
from connectivity between entities is found in the book of Genesis: 
“Here they are, one people with a single language, and now they have 
started to do this [building the Tower of Babel]; henceforward nothing 
 53. For example, banks created clearinghouses to facilitate the exchange and redemption of 
bank notes and later checks. See Alan S. Frankel, Monopoly and Competition in the Supply and 
Exchange of Money, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 313, 325 (1998). Later, banks created networks facilitating 
ATM and credit card transactions. Id. at 338–41. 
 54. This does not mean that network effects inevitably result in natural monopolies. 
Differences in the quality of competing network goods or in their production costs may offset the 
relative advantage of the larger network. Furthermore, at a certain point, production costs often 
exhibit decreasing returns to scale (i.e., they rise as production increases). This increase in cost may 
offset the increasing returns to scale derived from the network effect. See S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen 
E. Margolis, Network Effects and Externalities, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 671, 672 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). 
 55. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 39, at 1767–68 (“Although most transactors are willing to 
deal with nonmembers (albeit somewhat reluctantly and on slightly different terms) as long as they 
have good reputations, they are extremely reluctant to deal with someone who has been expelled 
from an association. As one mill explained, for a merchant, ‘be[ing] expelled [from a shippers’ 
association] is usually a death blow to [his] business.’” (alterations in original)). 
 56. See Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 54, at 671. 
 57. See Jeffrey Rohlfs, A Theory of Interdependent Demand for a Communications Service, 5 
BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 16 (1974) (noting network effects in communications services 
industries and examining the influence of network effects on pricing and barriers to entry into the 
industry). 
 58. See David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, A Guide to the Antitrust Economics of 
Networks, 10 ANTITRUST 36 (1996). 
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they have a mind to do will be beyond their reach.”59 Language is 
characterized by network effects—the benefit derived from 
communicating in a language increases significantly as more people are 
familiar with it.60 Increased “membership” in this network (i.e., fluency 
in the language) allows communication and coordination among a larger 
number of people, which confers greater benefits to each of them. Babel 
was destroyed by undoing its linguistic network: 
‘Come, let us go down there and confuse their speech, so that they will 
not understand what they say to one another.’ So the Lord dispersed 
them from there all over the earth, and they left off building the city. 
That is why it is called Babel, because the Lord there made a babble of 
the language of all the world.61
In the rest of this section, this Article will discuss two aspects of 
network effects that are important in their implications on networks’ 
effectiveness as regulators. First, this Article will examine compatibility, 
which produces network effects, but the manipulation of which may be a 
powerful form of opportunistic behavior. Second, this Article will 
discuss the literature analyzing the impact of network effects on forms of 
organization. This Article adds to that line of literature by showing how a 
network form of organization enforces norms and when it is effective in 
doing so. 
2. Compatibility, incompatibility, and harm from compatibility 
Network effects are derived from compatibility, which allows several 
people to use the same network. Compatibility may be achieved by joint 
decision (e.g., coordinated acceptance of a standard) or unilaterally by a 
single firm constructing an “adapter” that makes its product compatible 
with another.62 Private incentives for compatibility may differ from 
public incentives, possibly resulting in private action that fails to 
maximize social welfare from the network effects. One strand of the 
literature on network effects examines the choice between unilateral and 
 59. Genesis 11:6 (New English Version). 
 60. For a more contemporary analysis of network effects of language, see Jeffrey Church & 
Ian King, Bilingualism and Network Externalities, 26 CAN. J. ECON. 337 (1993). 
 61. Genesis 11:7–8 (New English Version). 
 62. Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 
75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 434–39 (1985). 
AVI-FIN--NAME FIXED.DOC 2/18/2004 1:26:36 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2003 
1198 
 
coordinated facilitation of compatibility.63 This issue is of considerable 
importance to antitrust scholarship, as coordinated facilitation of 
compatibility is usually more suspect of being used for anticompetitive 
ends than its unilateral counterpart, and it is therefore important to 
understand whether it has a redeeming advantage in increasing social 
welfare through exploitation of network effects.64  
Partial compatibility (i.e., compatibility among some but not all 
firms or individuals) results in competition between several networks.65 
Scholars dispute whether this competition leads, as may be expected of a 
competitive process, to the adoption of the most efficient network (e.g., 
the network providing the most efficient service or promulgating the 
most efficient standard or norm). Katz and Shapiro demonstrate that the 
presence of network effects leads to multiple equilibria in a competition 
between networks, and consumer expectation is key in determining 
which equilibrium emerges.66 Generally, as the argument goes, 
consumers will prefer to join a network that they perceive as likely to 
become or is already the market leader. This preference may trump 
consumers’ preferences regarding the product or service itself, so that an 
inferior product that is perceived to be the market leader, perhaps 
because it was a first-mover into the market, will be preferred over 
superior but smaller competitors.67
 63. See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Converters, Compatibility, and the Control of 
Interfaces, 40 J. INDUS. ECON. 9, 32 (1992) [hereinafter Farrell & Saloner, Control of Interfaces] 
(finding that when adapters do not facilitate perfect compatibility, their introduction might reduce 
social welfare below that in an industry without adapters at all); Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, 
Coordination Through Committees and Markets, 19 RAND J. ECON. 235 (1988) (comparing 
committee agreement on standards, unilateral declarations of standards by single firms followed by 
independent decisions by other firms concerning which standard to follow, and a hybrid system 
adapting features of both the committee and the market leadership mechanisms). 
 64. See Eliason Corp. v. Nat’l Sanitation Found., 614 F.2d 126, 129 (6th Cir. 1980) (stating 
that alleged boycotts arising from industry self-regulation do not give rise to a Sherman Act 
violation absent discrimination or manifestly anticompetitive and unreasonable conduct); FEDERAL 
TRADE COMMISSION & UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR 
COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS (2000). But see Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am. v. 
FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 461, 468 (1941) (condemning coordinated activity aimed at preventing and 
punishing “style piracy” and stating that “even if copying were an acknowledged tort under the law 
of every state, that situation would not justify petitioners in combining together to regulate and 
restrain interstate commerce”). 
 65. Members of each network enjoy compatibility among themselves but not with members 
of other networks. If members of one network were compatible with members of another network, 
the two networks would have been, in effect, a single network, and thus would not compete with 
each other. 
 66. See Katz & Shapiro, supra note 62. 
 67. Id. at 439. See also Katz & Shapiro, supra note 49, at 825. 
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This argument led to a line of literature examining network effects as 
barriers to entry and as the cause of the alleged persistence or “lock-in” 
of less efficient network goods.68 If network “lock-in” theory, which has 
been disputed by some scholars, is correct, then an inefficient norm may 
nonetheless prevail because the network enforcing it is larger and 
therefore confers greater network effects than rival networks enforcing 
other more efficient but less popular norms. However, even if the “lock-
in” theory is correct, it may have less force regarding the perseverance of 
inefficient norms than that of a technical standard because there are 
several potential regulators other than networks that could adopt a more 
efficient norm if the regulating network declines to adopt it. The bigger 
the relative advantage of a network in enforcing the norm,69 the more 
resistant it would be to the threat of competing regulators (and thus the 
more able it is to persist with an inefficient norm). The less efficient the 
network’s norm is compared to the alternative norm, the lower the 
network’s resistance to the threat of competing regulation. Network 
“lock in,” if it is significant, may also affect the resilience of networks in 
adapting themselves to increase their ability and incentive to regulate 
efficiently.70
Increased compatibility does not always increase social welfare. First 
of all, network effects (i.e., demand-side increasing return to scale) are 
 68. Katz and Shapiro demonstrated that the presence of network effects may lead to excessive 
standardization. Katz & Shapiro, supra note 49. Farrell and Saloner created a model suggesting that 
new technology may not be adopted even if it is superior to existing technology, because of “excess 
inertia” caused by the presence of an installed base. Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Installed Base and 
Compatibility: Innovation, Product Preannouncements, and Predation, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 940, 954 
(1986). Among the anecdotal empirical evidence they cite in support of their theory is the persistence of 
the allegedly inefficient “QWERTY” keyboard, an anecdote that was used in another article to 
demonstrate that industries may lock in to inefficient standards. Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics 
of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 332 (1985). Other scholars rejected the likelihood of an inefficient 
lock-in. Liebowitz and Margolis refuted the lock-in hypothesis in the QWERTY anecdote as well as in 
another much-cited anecdote—the VHS/Beta competition over the video cassette standard. See S.J. 
Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1990); S.J. Liebowitz & 
Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependency, Lock-in, and History, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205, 208–09 
(1995). On these two anecdotes and a few others, see also Michael I. Krauss, Regulation v. Markets in 
the Development of Standards, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 781, 800–08 (1994); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen 
E. Margolis, Should Technology Choice be a Concern to Antitrust Policy?, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 283, 
314–16 (1996). This issue is still hotly debated among scholars. See, e.g., William E. Cohen, 
Competition and Foreclosure in the Context of Installed Base and Compatibility Effects, 64 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 535, 539–46 (1996). 
 69. A discussion of the circumstances that affect networks’ ability to enforce norms will 
follow infra Part IV.B. 
 70. This Article will discuss networks’ ability to change in a manner that increases their 
incentive to regulate efficiently infra Part IV.B.3. 
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usually reduced and might even reverse above a certain point. At a point, 
they may become “network defects”—a net disutility from an increase in 
the number or volume of users of the network good. Reasons for this 
reversal may include congestion on the network or relative advantages of 
one system over another that have to be sacrificed to ensure 
compatibility.71
Second, the connectivity that enables the flow of positive 
externalities also enables the flow of negative externalities. For example, 
a computer virus that exploits a loophole in Microsoft Outlook is much 
more dangerous when most people use that program (and therefore 
become infected and subsequently infect others). Similarly, while 
interaction between people is the source of network benefits in a social 
network, it is also the channel by which communicable diseases spread; 
tighter social connectivity results in faster and more harmful 
communication of diseases. Indeed the recent SARS epidemic 
demonstrated the importance of quarantining (a social network’s form of 
reduction in network connectivity). 
Therefore, there may be a maximum efficient size for a network and 
a refusal to allow compatibility with other systems may be designed to 
prevent a network from expanding beyond its efficient size. Furthermore, 
 71. Congestion is a major limit on efficient scales in rivalrous networks, i.e., networks in 
which, besides the positive network externality, there is a negative externality imposed by an 
additional member of the network on the other members. Rivalrous networks include, inter alia, 
cellular phones, broadband internet, and peer-to-peer information networks. Nonrivalrous networks, 
such as languages, PC or video cassette standards, etc., do not suffer from congestion; it is no more 
difficult for me to express myself in English merely because many millions of additional people also 
express themselves in English. However, other traits might impose a limit on the efficient size of the 
network. For example, certain languages may express some matters in greater precision than others 
and compatibility, meaning integrating one language into another or creating a one-to-one translation 
for each word, will result in losing those nuances. Eskimos are said to have hundreds of words 
describing types of ice. See Jennifer L. Tomsen, “Traditional” Resource Uses and Activities: 
Articulating Values and Examining Conflicts in Alaska, 19 ALASKA L. REV. 167, 196 (2002) 
(“Yupik Eskimos living in central Alaska developed an immense variety of words to describe the 
snow and ice around them.”). To allow complete compatibility with other languages, all these 
nuanced differences must be sacrificed and the various words translated into the general word “ice.” 
The same is true for standards. For example, the JPEG computer graphic file standard is better than 
the competing GIF standard for multi-color images, but poorer when the image contains large areas 
with the same color. See John Wurtzel, GIF vs. JPEG, (Jul. 31, 1997), at http://hotwired.lycos.com/ 
webmonkey/geektalk/97/30/index3a.html?tw=design. The choice between standards or languages 
will depend on which nuances or special advantages are more commonly used by each prospective 
member of the network. Those with a strong preference for a nuance or specific advantage will 
prefer to maintain this advantage even at the price of foregoing additional network benefits (e.g., 
people who care for minute differentiation when referring to types of ice might prefer to speak a 
more obscure, but also more exacting, language). 
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facilitating compatibility has various costs.72 For this reason, a refusal to 
be compatible may at times increase social welfare. 
However, firms may have incentives to refuse to be compatible even 
when compatibility would increase social welfare. Farrell and Saloner 
observe that in deciding whether to make two technologies compatible 
where one technology is supplied by a single firm, that firm may have an 
incentive to make conversion costly.73 Cremer, Rey, and Tirole expand 
on this insight, terming this increase in the cost of compatibility (or a 
reduction in its quality) “degradation.”74 They refer to compatibility as 
“connectivity” and examine the plausibility of such a strategy and its 
effect on social welfare. This Article examines, among other issues, 
“degradation” as a form of opportunistic behavior.  
3. Network effects and forms of organization 
While the social welfare implications of network effects have been 
and continue to be examined thoroughly, less attention has been given to 
the implications of network effects on the form of organization. Even 
less attention has been given within this latter issue to the implications of 
network effects on institutions that mitigate opportunism (i.e., how 
network effects are used to fight “garden-variety” opportunism and how 
institutions combat opportunism that is unique to network environments). 
Much of the research following Macaulay’s observation on opting 
out of the (public) legal system examines bilateral, relationship-based 
transacting, in which reputational investments in the relationship serve as 
collateral against opportunism. Geertz notes that buyers and sellers in 
bazaars tend to pair off in recurrent transactions.75 Posner points out a 
similar pattern of “barter friendships” within primitive societies, which 
require the parties to observe standards of loyalty similar to those they 
 72. These costs include actual costs of coordination, loss of freedom to vary due to the need 
to remain compatible, forced disclosure of proprietary information, facilitating anticompetitive 
coordination, etc. 
 73. Farrell & Saloner, Control of Interfaces, supra note 63, at 26–28. 
 74. Jacques Cremer, Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, Connectivity in the Commercial Internet, 48 
J. INDUS. ECON. 433, 435 (2000). 
 75. Clifford Geertz, The Bazaar Economy: Information and Search in Peasant Marketing, 68 
AM. ECON. REV. 28, 30–31 (1978). For similar observations, see also CYRIL BELSHAW, 
TRADITIONAL EXCHANGES AND MODERN MARKETS 78–81 (1965) (noting that traders in traditional 
markets tend to personalize their exchange relations to mitigate contractual uncertainty or 
opportunism). 
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owe their kinsmen.76 Such a status and its attached obligations serve to 
mitigate opportunism despite the absence of public enforcement.77 Landa 
expands Geertz’s and Posner’s observations by considering a wider 
network relationship, which she identifies as “an ethnically 
homogeneous middleman group.”78 This group facilitates exchanges 
where government enforcement of law is deficient—and the certainty of 
abiding by contracts is consequently lacking—by taking advantage of the 
high barriers to entry into an ethnic social group. These high barriers 
create a need to stay on good terms with one’s existing ethnic group.79 
Landa follows the method of analysis used earlier by Akerlof to explain 
the caste system in India:80 an ethnic group can impose an efficient code 
of behavior through the threat of exclusion, and it can provide low-cost, 
accurate information on the trustworthiness of its members by 
economizing on information collection. Landa’s focus, therefore, is on 
networks’ mitigation of informational asymmetries. 
A few scholars have examined the effects networks have in 
coordinating punishment against opportunists. Greif modeled a 
“Multilateral Punishment Strategy” patterned after the Maghribi 
merchant coalitions.81 His model considers what is effectively a 
decentralized network in which the decisions (mainly, whether to punish 
or exclude opportunists) are made by each member separately, and the 
network facilitates the exchange of information that identifies a member 
as an opportunist.82 Clay modified this model patterned after merchant 
coalitions in early nineteenth-century Mexican California to incorporate 
 76. Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Primitive Society, with Special Reference to Law, 23 J.L. 
& ECON. 1, 26 (1980). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Landa, supra note 45, at 350. 
 79. It is worthwhile to note that the barriers to entry into an ethnic social group are generally 
not directly related to network effects. The difficulty of joining such a group does not tend to have a 
relationship to the size of the group but rather to its customs of recognizing kinship. Ethnic groups 
rarely accept as kin people who are unrelated by blood or marriage, though, as Posner notes in his 
article, supra note 76, at 26, this occasionally occurs. Since it is difficult to join a new ethnic group, 
severing ties with one’s original ethnic group is harmful, especially in a society in which most 
people do not deal with others who are not of their ethnic group. 
 80. See George Akerlof, The Economics of Caste and of the Rat Race and Other Woeful 
Tales, 90 Q.J. ECON. 599, 608–11 (1976). 
 81. Greif, supra note 43, at 531–42. 
 82. Because the network-facilitated exchange of information on trustworthiness still leaves 
decisions on how to react to this information to the individual merchants, this is an example of the 
information mechanism which will be discussed infra Part III.B.1. If the network also coordinated 
actions on the information (e.g., by having a committee make a decision binding on all members as 
to who could be boycotted due to dishonesty), it would be an example of the exclusion mechanism. 
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different strategies of specific merchants regarding dealing with people 
who other members of the network tagged as “dishonest.”83 McMillan 
and Woodruff point to the role of private-order organizations in 
coordinating responses to opportunism.84
This Article classifies the mechanisms that networks use to mitigate 
opportunism from a perspective of manipulation of network effects. Two 
of these mechanisms, the information mechanism and the exclusion 
mechanism, are refinements of elements the private-ordering literature 
has observed—reputation and boycott/refusal to deal, respectively. The 
Article also identifies two other mechanisms that are used by networks to 
enforce norms—the control mechanism and the switching mechanism. 
B. Mechanisms for Regulation by Networks 
Network effects are the source of several comparative advantages 
that networks possess in regulating compared to regulation by other 
institutions. The mechanisms used by networks to enforce norms are also 
used by nonnetwork regulators (e.g., in transaction regulation). However, 
network effects make each of these mechanisms more effective. 
Therefore, in situations where these mechanisms are effective in 
enforcing norms, networks are likely to be a more effective regulator 
than other potential regulators. 
1. Information mechanism 
The first of four norm-enforcement mechanisms employed by 
networks is the information mechanism—collecting and disseminating 
among members and nonmembers information mainly regarding the 
credibility of firms that are members of the network. The information 
mechanism facilitates independent decisions by firms, such as whether to 
deal with a firm that the network reports as having acted 
opportunistically. This mechanism complements the exclusion and 
control mechanisms by expanding the scope of sanctions beyond 
members of the network to nonmembers.85
The information mechanism is not unique to networks. Independent 
firms invest in collecting information on potential business partners and 
 83. Clay, supra note 43. 
 84. McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 35. This role comes in addition to the role of 
collecting information to detect opportunism. 
 85. The information mechanism also expands the scope of enforcement among the network 
members to sanctions that are not imposed collectively by the network. 
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may monitor their behavior. However, there are significant economies of 
scale to monitoring transactions and collecting and verifying information 
on trustworthiness,86 and private parties may have too small a transaction 
volume at stake to justify extensive collection of information. Private 
information collection firms, such as credit rating agencies, can exploit 
these economies of scale just as well as networks by specializing in 
monitoring and collecting information and selling the information to 
many interested parties. Yet networks may have an advantage over 
information collection firms regarding information on their members, 
particularly when their control mechanism is effective. When members 
transact mostly over the network’s transacting facilities, an ancillary 
byproduct is that the network can monitor the transactions quickly and 
accurately at a low cost. Even when a centralized transacting facility is 
absent, networks may acquire information on members more cheaply 
than outsiders. (For example, social networks usually lack a centralized 
transacting facility, yet gossip on members is transmitted frequently.) 
Networks not only have a cost advantage over other parties in 
collecting and verifying information on members, but also greater 
credibility in conveying this information to nonmembers. If a network 
successfully induces nonmembers to join the network’s own decision to 
exclude a member, it increases the magnitude of the sanction (and thus 
the ability to enforce norms) by increasing the scope of people 
sanctioning the excluded member. 
2. Exclusion mechanism 
A second mechanism that networks use to enforce norms is the 
exclusion mechanism—denying the offending network member access to 
the network, either permanently (expulsion) or temporarily (suspension). 
Since network effects, when significant, grant considerable utility and 
markedly decrease the cost of transacting, revoking a member’s access to 
the network can be a serious sanction. Therefore, the network wields a 
significant threat over its members in the form of exclusion from the 
network.87 Exclusion is possible, of course, not only in network 
 86. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market 
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 600 (1984). 
 87. The use of suspension as a penalty, instead of exclusion, is sometimes preferred in order 
to avoid an “endgame” situation in which the expelled party has nothing to lose once it acts 
opportunistically in a certain instance. See Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 30, at 129. 
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transactions but in bilateral transactions as well (e.g., Jane may refuse to 
transact with John). 
However, the exclusion mechanism is more effective when 
employed by networks than by individual parties to the transaction 
because a network coordinates the exclusion decision among all its 
members. As mentioned above,88 coordination of anti-opportunism 
measures enhances the effectiveness of these measures. A network is in 
an excellent position to coordinate members’ sanctions and, through 
exclusion, to deny the offending party the network benefits conferred by 
the other members. In some industries, most business is conducted 
through the network, and therefore exclusion from the network precludes 
a firm from most potential transactions. In many industries, exclusion 
from certain networks results in nonmembers’ refusal to deal with the 
excluded firm.89 Hence, exclusion from a network may result in 
exclusion from the entire line of business; this is a very powerful 
sanction, rivaling the government’s in effectiveness.90 However, 
exclusion may be ineffective when the severing of ties harms the 
network more than the individual member; This Article will address such 
situations below in the discussion of degradation.91
Besides denying the opportunistic member the network’s benefits, 
exclusion also reduces the value of or eliminates the network-specific 
investments that the member has made. The nature and value of these 
 88. See supra Part III.A.3 (citing McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 35). 
 89. Nonmembers’ refusals to deal may be independent, due to viewing the expulsion as a 
signal regarding the trustworthiness of the expelled member. Alternatively, nonmembers might have 
undertaken an obligation to refuse to deal with persons expelled or otherwise sanctioned by the 
network. Such obligations de facto expand the size of the network that is being regulated. An 
example of such an obligation is a bylaw of the World Federation of Diamond Bourses, requiring all 
members to enforce arbitration judgments of other members. See Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 
30, at 121. 
 
 90. As Bernstein has noted, 
In most industries . . . it is rarely necessary for a party to seek judicial enforcement of an 
[arbitration] award. Merchant tribunals are able to place their own pressures on the 
parties to comply promptly with their decisions. In the diamond industry, for example, 
when a party does not comply with an arbitration award, every diamond bourse in the 
world posts his picture along with a statement detailing his noncompliance. He may also 
be suspended or expelled from the bourse that rendered the judgment and banned from 
entering all bourses in the World Federation of Diamond Bourses. Being subject to these 
types of sanctions makes it unlikely that a trader will be able to remain in the diamond 
business. 
Bernstein, Private Commercial Law, supra note 30, at 109. 
 91. See infra Part III.C.2. 
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investments varies from network to network. Investments may include 
physical elements required to connect with the network (which may be 
unsalvageable and useless if connection to the network is denied), 
network-wide reputation, etc. Viewed from this perspective, the assets 
over which a member surrenders control to the network are a form of 
bond92 or “hostage.”93 An example is the charge of admission fees by 
trade associations and their control over information they provide to their 
members. Trade associations may confiscate these fees and other assets 
over which the network has control as sanctions against a member’s 
opportunistic behavior.94
3. Control mechanism 
The control mechanism makes use of centralized control95 over 
facilities required for transacting. Such centralized facilities include 
electricity grids run by independent system operators, or the eBay servers 
that process all transactions that are made through the online auction site. 
In social networks, these facilities might be reputation or accrued 
goodwill. In transportation networks, these might be terminals and 
jointly-used tracks or roads. In exchanges, they are clearinghouses and 
funds that are controlled by the network as their transfer is processed. 
The primary effect of the control mechanism is preventative—
control over network facilities allows the network to better monitor 
transactions for opportunism and possibly prevent or modify these 
transactions. For example, transacting through internet auction websites 
usually involves the use of centralized servers controlled by the operator 
of the network. This control enables both monitoring by the operator for 
opportunistic, usually fraudulent, behavior and prevention of transactions 
 92. See Kranton, supra note 18, at 214–17. 
 93. See Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 
73 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1983). 
 94. For example, such a mechanism exists in the cotton industry. See Bernstein, supra note 
39, at 1737 n.69 (“In addition to paying the annual membership fee, members are required to 
purchase a membership in the Exchange. The By-Laws provide that when a member fails to pay an 
arbitration award, the prevailing party has a right to make a claim against his membership. If the 
noncomplying party still refuses to pay, his membership is auctioned off and the award is paid from 
the proceeds.”); id. at 1768 (“[W]hen a transactor is expelled from an association, he must forfeit his 
membership fee as well as other tangible benefits of association membership such as price sheets, 
technology circulars, and access to the group’s information services.”). 
 95. “Centralized control” means the ability of the network to either monitor or direct activity 
over facilities used for transacting. 
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that are likely to be fraudulent.96 As with the other enforcement 
mechanisms, the control mechanism may, in certain cases, be employed 
in bilateral transactions. The investment in creating an independent, 
centralized transacting facility is typically large so such facilities are 
rarely formed solely to regulate norm enforcement. Rather, they are 
typically created to reduce the costs of transacting. An investment in a 
centralized transacting facility is more economically feasible when the 
transactions it facilitates are more complex (e.g., involving more parties) 
and larger in aggregate volume. Because they involve transactions with 
more parties, transactions on a network tend to be more complex than 
bilateral transactions, and often the aggregate volume of transacting 
tends to be larger in networks than in alternative bilateral transacting. As 
a result, networks frequently have centralized transacting facilities that 
can facilitate the control mechanism. 
4. Switching mechanism 
The switching mechanism is the replacement of a defaulted 
transaction with an alternative one, with minimal loss of transaction-
specific investment. A network is often able to mitigate the damage 
caused by opportunistically defaulted transactions by quickly and 
inexpensively finding an alternative to the defaulting party.97 The ability 
to find an alternative transaction not only mitigates the damage from the 
opportunistic default (by transferring some of the reliance investment in 
the defaulted transaction to another transaction) but also deters some 
types of opportunism that are based on renegotiating an agreement with 
captive customers. 
For example, John and Jane are dealers in premium widgets. 
Premium widgets are very expensive luxury items, and only foolish 
dealers deal with partners that lack an established reputation. 
Furthermore, the size of the deal, and therefore the amount of risk a 
default on it would pose to the injured party, depends on the degree to 
which the other party’s reputation has been established. Therefore, deals 
with new partners are initially small and grow as the partner’s reputation 
is established. If no network (i.e., exchange) exists, John and Jane would 
 96. On the actions of internet auction sites to combat opportunism, see James M. Snyder, 
Online Auction Fraud: Are the Auction Houses Doing All They Should or Could to Stop Online 
Fraud?, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 453, 460–62 (2000). 
 97. In the terms and context of the Uniform Commercial Code, this would be considered 
“covering” for a breached transaction. See U.C.C. § 2-712 (2003). 
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be sensible to concentrate their transactions with each other, building 
their respective reputations and giving them the assurance required to 
risk bigger and more profitable transactions. In fact, that is precisely 
what they did, and John has dealt to date exclusively with Jane. Now, 
having reached sizable and therefore both very risky and very profitable 
transactions, Jane reneges on an agreement and offers to renegotiate it in 
a manner much more favorable to her. She may find it profitable to do so 
if she, unlike John, has alternative trading partners, or if the stakes in this 
particular deal are so great as to dwarf her future expected gain from 
dealing with John. John can either acquiesce to the renegotiated deal or 
lick his wounds and begin trading with someone else, expending time 
and foregone profits as he builds his reputation anew. 
John could fare better if premium widgets were traded on the 
Premium Widget Exchange, which, like many exchanges, has an 
efficient switching mechanism. Reputation is exchange-wide, perhaps 
because the exchange collects and reliably assesses each member’s past 
behavior, and each exchange member consults with her potential 
partner’s reputation record, which the exchange provides in order to 
decide whether the potential partner is trustworthy enough for the size of 
the deal contemplated.98 Upon Jane’s reneging on the agreement, John 
could, if he were a member of the exchange, easily trade with another 
exchange member, foiling Jane’s attempt to renegotiate. Other exchange 
members would regard John’s reputation as established based on his 
previous dealings with Jane, which were recorded and positively 
assessed by the exchange. A distinction should be made between two 
mechanisms that operated in this example: the information mechanism 
supplied John’s potential trading partners with a credible account of 
John’s reputation; the switching mechanism supplied John with access to 
several alternatives to transacting with Jane so that upon Jane’s default 
John could inexpensively find an alternative partner to the transaction. 
Switching mechanisms are not unique to networks. A switching 
mechanism has been found to deter opportunism and increase reliance in 
bilateral relationships in nonnetwork environments.99 Absent elaborate 
and accessible reputation-assessing and distributing systems, network 
transactions may sometimes be more anonymous than bilateral 
transactions. But when it is feasible for networks to construct such 
 98. An example of a similar exchange-wide reputation database is eBay’s feedback forum. 
See http://pages.ebay.com/services/forum/feedback.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2003). 
 99. See Thomas M. Palay, Comparative Institutional Economics: The Governance of Rail 
Freight Contracting, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 265, 271–73 (1984). 
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systems, they have two advantages over other institutions in using the 
switching mechanism. First, in network environments many investments 
tend to be network-specific rather than transaction-specific, and therefore 
they are salvageable through the switching mechanism. For example, the 
switching mechanism allows partners who have established good 
reputations to switch trading partners without the cost of reestablishing 
reputation. The switching mechanism is not as effective in bilateral 
trading as in a network environment because a trader’s reputation must 
be reestablished each time she loses a partner, whereas in a network the 
reputation is network-wide and need not be reestablished when 
transacting with another network member. 
Second, because networks usually reduce the cost of identifying 
partners to a transaction, more alternative partners can be reached and 
thus the transacting environment is more competitive. Contrast, for 
example, discrete bilateral agreements to purchase a Pez dispenser with 
purchasing the same Pez dispenser on eBay. The increased competition 
and deeper market result in a smaller difference between the defaulted 
transaction and the next-best alternative. For these two reasons, the 
switching mechanism tends to be more effective in network 
environments than in nonnetwork ones. 
C. Opportunism in Network Environments 
1. Breach 
Most of the literature regarding private ordering addresses 
opportunistic behavior that shares certain traits: (1) there is a large 
benefit to the opportunistic party from defaulting on a specific 
transaction; (2) there is a loss to the same party from potential future 
transactions that are affected by the default on the specific transaction (or 
at least a probability of such a loss depending on whether the 
opportunistic behavior is detected); and (3) the benefit from defaulting 
on the specific transaction outweighs the losses in future transactions. 
This Article classifies opportunistic behavior having these characteristics 
as “breach” in order to distinguish it from another type of opportunism, 
“degradation,” which is described below.100 A typical example of breach 
 100. Despite the term’s implied relationship to breach in a contracts or torts context, 
opportunistic behavior of the “breach” type need not involve a legal breach of duty or contract. Nor 
does it require certainty of, or intent to, default. For example, this Article would consider insolvency 
to be breach-type opportunism since the potentially insolvent party gains from the specific 
AVI-FIN--NAME FIXED.DOC 2/18/2004 1:26:36 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2003 
1210 
 
is failure to pay: the fraudulent party receives the good or service 
provided to him without incurring its cost, thereby gaining its value. That 
party loses future transactions—most likely all future transactions with 
the party he cheated and possibly also transactions with others who have 
heard of his actions. He may even lose future transactions with people 
who do not suspect him specifically but have heard of the fraud and 
cease to deal with unfamiliar parties due to the increased risk of fraud. 
When a party chooses to defraud, it would be reasonable to assume that it 
expects the gain from the specific transaction it defaults on to be greater 
than the discounted aggregate loss of potential future transactions. 
2. Degradation 
Breach is not the only type of opportunistic behavior in network 
environments. Another type of opportunism, which this Article calls 
“degradation,”101 is unique to network environments. Degradation is a 
predatory act that weakens the network, harming smaller firms more than 
larger ones thereby giving larger firms an advantage over smaller 
competitors. One might view degradation as a form of the strategy 
known as raising rivals’ costs,102 adapted to prey on firms more 
dependent on network effects than the degrading firm.103
The following example illustrates the goals and effects of 
degradation: Goliath Corp. is a telephone company with a 70% market 
share. Goliath makes modifications to the facilities connecting it with 
other telephone companies so that any call between a customer of 
Goliath and a customer of a competing company suffers from static 
noise. Calls in which both parties are Goliath customers and calls in 
which neither party is a Goliath customer are unaffected. Betty is a 
customer of David Inc., a small competitor of Goliath. Approximately 
70% of the people Betty calls are Goliath customers, correlating with 
Goliath’s market share. This means that if she remains a customer of 
transaction on which it defaulted, loses potential future transactions, and imposes losses on other 
parties with regard to both the defaulted transaction and lost future transactions. 
 101. This Article follows the term used to describe the same type of behavior in Cremer, Rey 
& Tirole, supra note 74, at 458. 
 102. On the strategy of raising rivals’ costs, see Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, 
Raising Rivals’ Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 267 (1983). 
 103. On degradation in nonnetwork contexts, see Amitai Aviram & Avishalom Tor, 
Overcoming Impediments to Information Sharing, 55 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003) (manuscript 
on file with the author). An earlier, working-paper version of the article is available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=435600. 
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David, 70% of her calls will suffer from static noise. If she switches from 
David to Goliath, static noise will affect only 30% of her calls, those to 
non-Goliath customers. 
Betty is therefore likely to switch to Goliath. This is precisely the 
reason Goliath adopted the degradation strategy. Though the quality of 
its service suffers from the degradation—30% of its calls are of lower 
quality than before—the degradation hurts the quality of the competitors’ 
services much more because 70% of their calls are affected. The 
migration of customers to the larger network compensates Goliath for the 
loss resulting from the reduced quality of its own service caused by the 
degradation. This strategy is not merely a hypothetical possibility; such 
strategies have been observed (or at least alleged), inter alia, in the credit 
card industry,104 the internet backbone industry,105 and the telephone 
industry.106
As the David and Goliath example demonstrates, degradation has 
different characteristics than breach. One significant difference is that the 
immediate payoff to a degrading party is often negative. For example, 
when Goliath degraded connectivity with David, Goliath’s customers 
(and indirectly, Goliath itself) were harmed by the static noise present in 
30% of their phone calls. However, the act of degradation (Goliath’s 
introduction of static noise in intercompany calls) raised all the network 
members’ costs in transacting over the network or reduced all members’ 
benefits from transacting over the network, which amounts to the same 
thing. Degradation therefore decreases aggregate network benefits, and 
the defaulting party stands to gain from the decrease in the efficiency of 
 104. See Amitai Aviram, Accommodating a New Tenant in the House of Cards: Introducing 
Competition into a Network Industry 24–25, 37–42 (Nov. 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with the author). 
 105. See Cremer, Rey & Tirole, supra note 74, at 434, 457–60. 
 106. See, e.g., Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp., 222 F.3d 390, 395 (7th Cir. 2000) (dealing 
with customers of incumbent telephone company who allege, among other things, that incumbent 
“has failed to provide interconnection between its network and those of competitors that is equal to 
the interconnections it gives itself,” that incumbent’s competitors “have experienced undue delays 
(presumably caused by Ameritech) in acquiring unbundled elements, and those delays have 
precluded them from offering services as attractive as [the incumbent’s],” and that incumbent “has 
continued to bill customers of competitors who have converted from Ameritech’s services, and 
hence some customers are being double-billed, thereby harming the competitors’ good will”); 
Cavalier Tel., LLC v. Verizon Va., Inc., 208 F. Supp. 2d 608, 611–12, 14 (E.D. Va. 2002) (dealing 
with entrant phone company alleging, among other things, that incumbent misrouted its calls, 
provided inferior databases and web-based interfaces for ordering loops or last-mile facilities, made 
the process of ordering last-mile facilities (which it controlled) “lengthy, complex, and expensive,” 
and intentionally made the billing process for loops costly for its competitors). 
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the network. Degradation may be feasible when one member of the 
network is much larger than other members. The demand-side economies 
of scale and scope, which characterize network environments, cause 
access to larger networks to be more desirable than access to smaller 
ones. Therefore, members of a large network are advantaged in 
competing with members of smaller networks or with firms that are not 
members of any network. In networks containing both larger and smaller 
firms, the larger firms may gain from weakening the network and 
competing with the smaller members in conditions closer to those that 
would exist in the absence of a network.107 This can be done by 
excluding others from the network108 or by degrading connectivity with 
other members of the network. 
When should we expect firms to degrade? In other words, when is 
degradation a feasible strategy to a network member? Degradation is 
likely to be a viable strategy only when the degrading firm cannot 
withdraw from the network since withdrawal would be the equivalent of 
absolute degradation—zero connectivity with the other former network 
members. Barriers to withdrawal from the network could be due to legal 
requirements (e.g., antitrust or regulatory mandates) or due to physical 
impracticability. For example, railroad companies cannot completely cut 
themselves out of a network, since the passengers could always walk 
from one railroad’s terminal to another’s; however, railroad companies 
can degrade by refusing to share terminal facilities or by refusing to sell 
joint tickets, etc.109
Two nuances regarding a network member’s decision whether or not 
to degrade should be noted. First, occasionally degradation is feasible 
against some network members but not against others, such as where 
reducing connectivity would harm the degrading firm less than some 
network members but more than other network members. In that case, 
 107. In most cases, the degrading firm is limited to depriving the other network members of 
the marginal network benefits attributable to the transactions contributed by the degrading firm. 
Only in rare cases could a degrading firm deprive other network members from network effects they 
confer on each other. In all other cases, victims of degradation still benefit from network effects 
created collectively by them. Therefore, unless the degrading firm is the only significant participant 
in the network, degradation usually cannot cause market conditions to be as if the network did not 
exist at all. 
 108. See A. Douglas Melamed, Network Industries and Antitrust, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
147, 152–55 (1999). 
 109. See, e.g., Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. v. Denver & N.O.R. Co., 110 U.S. 667, 667, 4 S. Ct. 
185, 186–87 (1884) (finding that Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad refused to “give or take 
through bills of lading, or to sell or receive through tickets, or to check baggage over” the line of the 
Denver & New Orleans Railroad). 
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the degrading firm’s competitive position against the less vulnerable 
firms would be weakened. The degrading firm would prefer selective 
degradation against the more vulnerable firms while maintaining 
efficient connectivity with the less vulnerable firms. Second, when the 
degrader is less vulnerable to small degrees of degradation than its rivals, 
but more vulnerable to greater degrees of degradation, degradation is 
unlikely to occur if a degrader can be threatened with exclusion from the 
network. 
Network benefits are not necessarily directly proportional to the 
amount of connectivity nor are they necessarily identical for all firms. It 
is possible that by reducing connectivity slightly, the degrading firm will 
harm itself less than its rivals, but upon a greater amount of degradation, 
such as complete withdrawal from the network, the situation will reverse 
and the harm to the degrading (withdrawing) firm will be greater than the 
harm to the remaining network members. If this is the situation, a firm 
may wish to degrade without withdrawing completely from the 
network.110 However, when a high degree of degradation is harmful to 
the degrading firm, the sanction of exclusion from the network may be 
an effective deterrent (depending, among other things, upon the 
network’s likelihood of detecting the degradation and responding by 
excluding the degrading firm). 
Degradation poses different challenges to regulation than breach. 
One of the traits that makes degradation more difficult to regulate than 
breach is the difficulty in detecting degradation. Regulating against both 
breach and degradation poses a difficulty in observing the opportunistic 
behavior and linking it to the opportunistic party (e.g., spotting the 
burglar breaking into the house or proving that the static noise on the 
phone line is the result of Goliath’s actions). But degradation is difficult 
 110. For example, suppose that in the David and Goliath hypothetical, the emergency services 
(police, fire department, etc.) were David’s customers and that the customers would not switch 
companies even if Goliath degraded connectivity. Goliath’s customers do not call those services 
often; therefore, they remain Goliath’s customers even if Goliath introduces static to intercompany 
phone calls. In other words, the customers prefer to be able to talk static-free in 70% of their calls 
(yet have some static on the line in the rare event they call the police) over talking static-free in only 
30% of their calls, including calls to emergency services. However, while having some static on the 
line when they call police is acceptable to the customers, being unable to call the police at all is not. 
Therefore, if Goliath further degrades by cutting out all contact with David customers, or if David 
responds to the static noise degradation by cutting Goliath off, Goliath’s customers will leave 
Goliath for David and other small rivals because they will prefer to have access to police in case of 
emergency, even at the cost of not talking on the phone with 70% of their friends. Knowing this, 
Goliath will not cut David off completely and may not degrade at all if it expects David to retaliate 
by cutting it off. 
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to identify even when the actual behavior is observed, since the “correct” 
degree of connectivity is very difficult to determine.111 To a significant 
extent, this is caused by poorly defined duties of connectivity. The ease 
of detecting breach depends, at least inter alia, on clearly-defined 
property and contractual rights with respect to the good or service in 
question. For example, we may observe Ann’s default on an obligation to 
Alice. It would be easy to identify whether this action is opportunistic 
breach if clear rules determine whether Ann’s obligation is binding. The 
laws of contract and property generally define rights to tangible property 
more clearly than antitrust law defines rights to access another’s network 
facilities; to use Carol Rose’s terms, contract and property law prefer (in 
most but not all cases) “crystal” rules, while antitrust law prefers 
“mud.”112
The looser definition of rights under antitrust law is not due to 
neglect. It is difficult, particularly for an “outsider” such as a regulator or 
the courts, to assess what the efficient degree of connectivity should be, 
especially since the most efficient degree varies widely with the 
peculiarities of each case. Imposing a duty of absolute connectivity 
would be meaningless; connectivity could always be enhanced. Thus, 
degradation might take the form of inaction or failure to upgrade 
connectivity when efficient connectivity requires upgrading. It is 
possible not to impose any duty of connectivity, and this policy would be 
clearly defined, but such a rule would never prevent degradation even 
where such a strategy is feasible to a specific firm and harmful to social 
welfare.113 Lacking a clear guide, courts and regulators often use the 
status quo as a benchmark and perceive decreases from that level of 
connectivity as impermissible degradation.114 While there is some merit 
 111. This Article assumes that the “correct” level of connectivity is the one that maximizes 
overall social welfare. While this is the mainstream presumption, it is by no means uncontested. 
Even if this standard is agreed upon, determining the correct level of connectivity is not simple. 
 112. See Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 577–78 
(1988). 
 113. See POSNER, supra note 6, at 251–55 (demonstrating how an exclusion from a network 
may prolong the existence of a monopoly and therefore be both feasible to the incumbent monopoly 
and harmful to social welfare). 
 114. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985) 
(condemning a firm’s refusal to sell joint tickets with a smaller rival after such joint tickets had been 
sold for several years); cf. Little Rock & M.R. Co. v. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co., 41 F. 559, 564 
(E.D. Ark. 1890), aff’d, 63 F. 775 (8th Cir. 1894). The St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern 
Railroad used to connect at Little Rock, Arkansas with the Little Rock & Memphis Railroad. Upon 
completing a track of its own to Memphis, SLIM&S Railroad refused to honor through tickets to 
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to economizing on information costs by deferring to the presumed 
efficiency of the status quo, this rule of thumb may be misleading, 
especially in industries characterized by rapid change as many network 
industries are. In such industries, change may affect the efficient level of 
connectivity, and yesterday’s efficient level, which has been the status 
quo, may be inefficient today. A connectivity benchmark based on the 
status quo may punish firms that adjust their level of connectivity to such 
changes. 
While most networks primarily face either one type of opportunism 
or the other, breach and degradation are not mutually exclusive. It is 
theoretically possible that some markets would be susceptible to both 
breach and degradation concerns.115 Furthermore, in several industries, 
different aspects of the industry involve different opportunism types. For 
example, the credit card industry is typically concerned with dishonor 
(default on credit card payments) and fraud issues, both of which are of 
the “breach” type.116 The very same industry, in countries having fewer 
issuers and merchant acquirers, may be more concerned with larger 
issuers employing a degradation strategy (e.g., slow and error-prone 
processing of transactions between themselves and other issuers) to slow 
the expansion of smaller competitors.117
3. Market structure and opportunism 
Market structure, which is characterized, inter alia, by the number 
and relative size of network members, significantly affects the type of 
opportunistic behavior to which an industry is prone. Industries 
Memphis using the LR&M Railroad and carried passengers to Memphis over its own lines instead. 
The court declined to prohibit this action. Id. 
 115. As discussed infra Part III.C.3, the type of opportunism an industry is prone to suffer 
from is significantly affected by the market structure of that industry. Industries with characteristics 
that are conducive to both breach and degradation may be susceptible to both. For example, it is 
possible to envision a market with one large firm and many small competitors. The large firm may 
attempt to degrade against the smaller rivals, while the small firms may commit breach. 
 116. On fraud rates in credit card and debit card transactions, see Ronald J. Mann, Credit 
Cards and Debit Cards in the United States and Japan, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1088–93, 1104–07 
(2002). On MasterCard’s efforts to reduce fraud, see MASTERCARD INC., FORM 10-K FOR THE 
FISCAL YEAR ENDED DEC. 31, 2002, 16 (2003), available at  
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1141391/000095012303002592/0000950123-03-002592-
index.htm. Fraud is a breach-type of opportunistic behavior because the gain to the opportunistic 
party from such behavior is derived from the benefits conferred directly on him or her (e.g., 
purchasing goods with a stolen credit card) rather than indirectly derived from the harm inflicted on 
a rival as would be the case with degradation-type opportunism. 
 117. See Aviram, supra note 104, at 37–42. 
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consisting of many small firms are likely to suffer from breach; 
industries consisting of a small number of large firms and industries in 
which firms have a high vulnerability variance, i.e., wide differentiation 
in the expected harm to each firm from opportunistic behavior, are likely 
to suffer from degradation. 
The reason for the relationship between firm size and the type of 
opportunistic behavior is rather straightforward. A breach decreases 
connectivity by increasing the costs of transacting—including both the 
losses caused by the breach and the costs expended by nonopportunistic 
parties to protect themselves from or insure themselves against future 
breach. Therefore, breach reduces aggregate network benefits. Small 
network members who breach do not suffer as much from the reduction 
in such benefits since the burden is divided among all members 
according to their share of the transaction volume, while the payoff from 
the fraud goes only to the breaching member. As for degradation, such a 
strategy is usually only beneficial to larger firms. Smaller firms are likely 
to be disadvantaged and possibly ineffective in employing a degradation 
strategy, as they cannot effectively compete alone against larger firms 
and they are not attractive for other firms to connect with. 
The relationship between the vulnerability variance in an industry 
and the risk of degradation stems from the driving motive for 
degradation—raising the costs to one’s rival more than the rise in one’s 
own costs in order to gain a competitive advantage over the rival. 
Naturally, degradation is more profitable the greater the difference in 
vulnerability between the degrading firm and its victim. When all firms 
suffer the same harm from degradation, no firm will attempt to degrade, 
since the degrading firm will not gain anything from it. As disparities in 
vulnerability to degradation increase, so does the payoff from 
degradation to the degrading firm. The greater the payoff, the more likely 
and more frequently degradation will occur. 
Market structure has an effect not only on the type of opportunistic 
behavior to which the market is more susceptible but also on the ability 
of a network to regulate conduct in order to mitigate opportunism. This 
relationship will be explored below118 following a short examination of 
how opportunism, both breach and degradation, affects social welfare. 
 118. See infra Part IV.C. 
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4. Social welfare effects of opportunism in network environments 
Breach and degradation may differ in their effects on social welfare. 
Social welfare is an aggregate measurement of the well-being of all 
individuals within society.119 An action that increases the well-being of 
one or more individuals in society without decreasing the well-being of 
any other members clearly increases social welfare. The assessment of 
effects on social welfare becomes much more difficult when an action 
increases the well-being of one individual at the same time it decreases 
the well-being of another. Such assessment would require rules 
governing the aggregation of individuals’ well-being, including 
determining the relative weight each individual’s well-being receives;120 
whether any of an individual’s preferences should not be considered in 
the aggregate;121 and quantifying the diverse range of preferences that 
affect one’s well-being.122 Reaching an actual number that measures the 
social welfare is a difficult, if not impossible, task. The number of 
abstractions and approximations needed to reach it would likely make 
such a figure useless. However, it is much easier to reach rough 
approximations regarding the effect of actions on social welfare, and 
these approximations, while not exact, are easy to assess and can provide 
important insights as to which actions are “better” in the sense of making 
society as a whole better off. 
This section will make such an approximation of the effects of 
breach and degradation on social welfare. The risk of breach raises the 
cost of transacting and therefore leads to a decrease in the number of 
 119. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 
985 (2001). For a formal expression of social welfare, see id. at 985 n.42. 
 120. The utilitarian model of social welfare gives the same weight to each individual’s well-
being. Some scholars object to this assumption by calling for preferential or even exclusive 
consideration of the well-being of the worst-off individuals. For a concise discussion of views on 
this matter, see id. at 987–88; David A. Weisbach, Should Legal Rules Be Used to Redistribute 
Income?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 442–43 (2003). 
 121. For example, one may argue for or against including hateful preferences, such as wishing 
someone else harm, in the calculus of social welfare. See Weisbach, supra note 120, at 442. 
 122. Quantifying preferences is difficult because many of them are nonpecuniary and in many 
cases even the individual herself does not have precise values attached to her preferences. Despite 
the difficulty, measuring only material preferences would significantly reduce the value of a social 
welfare calculus by making it less connected to an individual’s actual well-being. See, e.g., Richard 
A. Posner, Wealth Maximization and Tort Law: A Philosophical Inquiry, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 99 (David G. Owen ed., 1995) (“The non-pecuniary dimension of 
wealth is important to emphasize, especially to non-economists, who are prone to assume that 
economists care only about goods and services that are priced in the market. Yet I concede the 
incompleteness of ‘wealth,’ even when so broadly defined, as a measure of social welfare.”). 
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beneficial transactions that take place. To illustrate, think of the reactions 
of people who trade on eBay when they learn of a surge in instances of 
fraud on the network. Individuals who are more risk-averse may stop 
trading on eBay. This would reduce utility not only for them, but also for 
the remaining traders who lose potential trading partners. Furthermore, 
parties to the remaining transactions may take action to decrease the risk 
of breach, and the cost of these actions further decreases social welfare. 
In the eBay example, the individuals who still trade on eBay may require 
payment by credit card, ask for collateral, or run extensive checks on 
their trading partners, all of which bear a cost. 
Complete prevention of breach may result in the enforcement of 
some inefficient deals since, if the network is successful in preventing all 
breaches, a member might not be able to “buy” its way out of an 
inefficient deal. However, there is good reason to believe that the 
regulator will be able to identify and allow efficient breaches.123 Also, 
due to the degree of reliance on deals in a network (which increases the 
social cost of breach), efficient breaches are likely to be uncommon in 
comparison with inefficient breaches.124 Furthermore, a firm that 
repeatedly finds itself committed to inefficient deals can opt out of the 
network. 
Assessment of the effects of degradation on social welfare is 
different. Degradation lowers the utility of interconnection or imposes 
 123. The regulator may require a portion of the gain from the efficient breach in order to allow 
it. It would, however, be in its interest not to demand a portion so large as to induce the firm not to 
commit efficient breach. 
 124. The following fact pattern illustrates why greater reliance reduces the likelihood of 
efficient breach. Alice and Ben sign a contract by which Alice will sell Ben her house for $100,000. 
This contract is good for both because Alice needs to relocate and therefore currently derives only 
$80,000 from the house, while Ben would receive $120,000 of utility from the house if he owned it. 
Before they close the deal, Carol persuades Alice to breach the contract with Ben and sell the house 
to her (Carol) for $130,000. This is good for both Alice and Carol. Alice receives $30,000 more than 
she would under the contract with Ben and Carol likes the neighborhood more than Ben does and 
would derive $150,000 of utility from the house if she owned it. The total utility under the Alice-Ben 
contract is $40,000. Alice gets $100,000 in return for an asset she values at $80,000, and Ben gets an 
asset he values at $120,000 in return for $100,000. The utility under the Alice-Carol contract is 
$70,000. Alice gets $130,000 for an asset she values at $80,000, and Carol gets an asset she values at 
$150,000 in return for $130,000. Therefore, if neither Alice nor Ben relied on the original contract, 
then the breach may be efficient. But suppose Ben, in reliance on the contract, sold his previous 
home, left his old job in favor of a job closer to the home he thought he was buying, and made other 
changes that will cause him a loss of $50,000 if he does not receive the house. In that case we must 
deduct $50,000 from the total utility under the Alice-Carol contract, bringing the total benefit down 
to $20,000, which is less than the $40,000 to be gained from the Alice-Ben contract. Therefore, the 
greater the parties’ reliance on the Alice-Ben contract, the more likely a breach thereof would be 
inefficient. 
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costs on it, thereby decreasing network benefits. This reduced utility or 
added cost leads to a decrease in the number of beneficial transactions 
that take place on the network. This results in a loss, not only to the 
parties that no longer find a transaction gainful after the added risk of 
degradation, but also to all network members who share in the loss of 
network benefits due to the decrease in transacting over the network. The 
added risk of degradation and the decrease in network benefits may 
cause some members to cease transacting through the network, perhaps 
seeking relative advantage by creating an alternative network in which 
members do not degrade or perhaps withdrawing from the market 
altogether because their small size does not enable them to compete. This 
reduction of transactions over the network further decreases network 
benefits and, if it results in less competition, also increases the 
deadweight loss.125 All of these effects reduce social welfare. 
Not every unilateral reduction in connectivity is degradation. Some 
actions that reduce connectivity do not reduce net social welfare and are 
not a form of degradation. Added connectivity is not always welfare-
enhancing. Like supply-side economies of scale, network effects may 
peak at a certain level. Above that level, more connectivity may reduce 
social welfare for reasons such as the cost of the added complexity. 
Therefore, connectivity above the maximum efficient scale of the 
network may be welfare-reducing even if it is costless to enforce. 
Furthermore, preventing a reduction in connectivity has costs as well. A 
prohibition of any reduction in connectivity is akin to an open-access 
requirement. Like open-access mandates, a limitation on the ability to 
reduce connectivity decreases the incentive of network members to 
invest in growing since the open access allows competitors to free ride 
on their success. As a result, incentives to compete among network 
members decline.126 Another concern with prohibiting degradation is 
that to make such a prohibition meaningful, someone needs to prescribe 
what the “right” level of connectivity is, from which a decrease would be 
 125. The deadweight loss is a loss of social welfare resulting from the use of market power to 
restrict output and raise prices. A deadweight loss increases as competition decreases. On 
deadweight loss created by reduced competition, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST 
POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE §1.3b (1994). 
 126. See Little Rock & M.R. Co. v. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co., 41 F. 559, 564 (E.D. Ark. 
1890) (“Competing lines afford the best and surest protection the public can have against oppressive 
rates . . . . Is it, under these circumstances, an unfair or unjust preference or discrimination for the 
defendant, in the sale of tickets, to prefer its own line to that of the plaintiff? If it is, the incentive to 
the construction of competing lines will be very much lessened.”). 
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considered degradation. As discussed above,127 the study and constant 
monitoring needed to assess the “correct” level are very costly, and, as 
with all forms of price or access pricing regulation, it is subject to a 
significant risk of error and to wasteful expenditures of resources on 
influencing the regulator. 
Can government rely on the quality of connectivity prescribed by the 
network and lend its enforcement mechanisms to impose those 
standards? This depends on whether networks treat welfare-reducing 
degradation differently than welfare-enhancing reductions in 
connectivity. At the time the alleged degradation takes place, the network 
is likely to condemn any reduction in connectivity regardless of its 
effects on social welfare, just as it does not distinguish between cheating 
a partner to a transaction and cheating a cartel. Both formally seem to be 
“breach,” though the latter is welfare-enhancing and therefore not viewed 
as opportunism. However, at the time of forming the network and 
determining the duties of its members, networks are likely to determine 
an efficient level of connectivity, i.e., allow “efficient degradation” 
which is not degradation at all. There would still be a problem when 
changing circumstances modified the efficient level of connectivity. 
Absent government intervention, the network might renegotiate its 
obligations. But when private sanctions are ineffective, lack of 
government intervention would allow the large firm to degrade. 
Therefore, independent government assessment of the “correct” level of 
connectivity should be appropriate where (1) the network is an inefficient 
regulator against degradation either because it lacks the ability or the 
incentive to prohibit degradation; (2) circumstances have changed since 
the formation of the network so that the efficient level of connectivity 
has changed; and (3) analysis of the practice that allegedly amounts to 
degradation indicates that it reduces social welfare. 
IV. NETWORKS AS EFFICIENT REGULATORS 
A. Comparing Regulators 
Part II.B of this Article discussed the various potential regulators and 
assessed the advantages and disadvantages of each. After discussing 
network effects and the enforcement mechanisms that utilize them, one 
can better assess some advantages networks possess in regulating. This 
 127. See supra Part III.C.2. 
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section will focus on networks’ ability to prevent some norm violations, 
and on networks’ ability to form and employ a common culture to reduce 
the costs of enforcing norms. 
1. Overview of potential regulators 
As mentioned above,128 several entities may act as regulators: first-
party regulators (self-regulation), second-party regulators (transaction 
regulation), network regulators, and government regulators. Self-
regulation assigns the role of regulator to the entity with both the greatest 
ability to detect and prevent opportunistic behavior as well as the least 
incentive to regulate. Self-regulation is also highly susceptible to self-
deception and discrepancies in culture and personal morality. 
Transaction regulation benefits from the familiarity of the parties with 
the regulated transaction and their ability to monitor it closely, but 
suffers from weak sanctions against offending parties. At the other end of 
the spectrum, furthest away from opportunistic behavior, is government 
regulation, which benefits from relatively powerful sanctions but which 
entails significant monitoring costs as well as significant costs of error. 
Network regulation is an alternative to self-regulation, transaction 
regulation, and government regulation. Networks often have a 
monitoring ability comparable to or surpassing that of the parties to the 
transaction. Networks’ strongest sanction—exclusion from the 
network—may be a greater deterrent than governmental sanctions. This 
is especially true where law enforcement is lacking or the threat of 
imprisonment is insignificant.129
2. Networks’ ability to prevent norm violation 
One advantage network regulation can have over its government 
counterpart is the ability to prevent some forms of opportunistic actions 
rather than prohibit and punish as the government does. The control 
mechanism in some cases enables the network to intercept and block 
transactions that are deemed unwanted. For example, eBay can delete 
listings of illegal items from its website. In addition to deterring 
opportunistic behavior, the switching mechanism can also prevent such 
behavior by preventing would-be victims from becoming captive to an 
opportunistic party. The exclusion mechanism, while punishing and 
 128. See supra Part II.B. 
 129. See supra note 25. 
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deterring, also prevents opportunists from trading opportunistically in the 
future in industries where most trading is done on an exchange.130 
Government’s arsenal of sanctions includes fines, injunctions, and 
incarceration. Fines deter and punish but do not prevent the harmful 
behavior. Neither does injunctive relief, since it does not physically 
prevent the harmful behavior but merely attaches a punishment 
thereto.131 The only preventive remedy the government has is 
incarceration, which not only punishes and deters but also physically 
prevents the opportunistic party from violating most norms while 
incarcerated. However, as mentioned above, incarceration is likely to be 
imposed upon only the most egregious norm violators. 
Forms of regulation that physically prevent a would-be opportunist 
from acting in a harmful way rather than deterring or punishing such 
behavior can be analogized to rules of physics, which, unlike rules of 
law, cannot be broken.132 The possession of such “rules of physics” 
gives networks a significant advantage over other potential regulators. 
Like rules of physics, however, these mechanisms are difficult to 
artificially create—they will not exist if efficient market structure 
dictates that a given network does not have the ability to track and block 
transactions or if many transactions in a given industry are done outside 
of networks. In contrast to rules of physics, rules of law are easier to 
artificially impose where they did not exist before. 
3. Networks and common culture 
Another advantage that some networks possess is a common culture 
shared by members. Common culture reduces costs involved in 
regulation in several ways. Since it creates a sense of belonging, it 
 130. For example, if John habitually defrauds his transacting partners, the exclusion 
mechanism would first serve to deter him from doing so as he recognizes that getting caught and 
excluded would impose serious costs on him. But if deterrence fails and John commits fraud, his 
exclusion from the network would prevent him from harming other network members. 
 131. An injunction is a threat of court sanction if the court’s order is violated. As such, 
additional enforcement costs are required to enforce the injunction (e.g., detection of the violation, 
proving the violation in contempt proceedings, etc.). Even then, to prevent a given conduct the 
penalty must either be incarceration (because fines would merely put a price tag on the violation) or 
it must be targeted not at the violator but at a private entity that has the ability to physically prevent 
the violator’s conduct (e.g., requiring eBay to delete listings of illegal items). The former alternative 
is unlikely—one who violates an injunction but who does not pose a physical threat is rarely 
incarcerated. The latter merely commandeers network regulation. 
 132. For an extensive discussion of regulation through “rules of law” and “rules of physics,” 
see LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 85-89 (1999) (using the term 
“architecture” to regard the various “rules of physics” methods of regulation). 
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widens the scope of services provided by the network to include social 
gratification. Therefore, the deterrence effect of exclusion from the 
network is greater because exclusion entails not only loss of business 
with network members, but also loss of social standing. Common culture 
also provides members with knowledge about matters relevant to the 
business transacted over the network and standardizes this knowledge 
among the network members, thus reducing information asymmetry. 
Further, a common culture creates a unique good—esteem or social 
standing in the group—which can be a powerful motivator to follow the 
norms of the group.133 Common culture may also add a psychological 
element to the enforcement of norms because a violation of the norms of 
one’s social group with which one empathizes or identifies may be 
perceived by oneself and by others as more morally wrong than violating 
the norms of more distant peoples or groups. Moreover, membership in a 
network may induce a sense of kinship that would increase the guilt 
associated with violating a norm that harms one’s “kin,” and may 
eliminate the ability to justify norm violation with an antipathy to 
“outsiders.”134 For all these reasons, common culture reduces the cost of 
enforcing norms. 
It is therefore unsurprising that networks and other institutions have 
attempted to create common cultures that facilitate the underlying 
business transactions.135 Part of the value in belonging to a common 
culture, however, is the difficulty in artificially producing it. The 
difficulty in finding or creating an alternative, equally attractive social 
group is what makes membership in the current group so valuable. It is 
difficult to create a common culture where there was none before, but if 
 133. See Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status 
Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003 (1995). 
 134. On guilt alleviation as an incentive to cooperate and reciprocate good behavior, see Lior 
Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of Cooperation on the File-
Swapping Networks, 89 VA. L. REV. 505, 563–67 (2003). 
 135. See, e.g., Bernstein, Private Commercial Law, supra note 30, at 110 (“[Trade 
associations] have also encouraged the emergence of informal information channels by creating 
opportunities for social interaction among members and their families. Many associations sponsor 
clubs for spouses and host regular sporting events and gala dinners. . . . They also link social 
reputation to commercial reputation, thereby increasing the cost to transactors of sacrificing 
reputation bonds and giving them stronger incentives to abide by their commercial commitments.”); 
Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 30, at 130 (“Another enforcement mechanism sometimes invoked 
by the arbitrators is a proceeding in Jewish rabbinical courts against the party who refuses to 
comply. Because these courts have the authority to ban an individual from participation in the Jewish 
community, this is a powerful threat against Orthodox members of the diamond industry.”); see also 
Landa, supra note 45. 
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an existing cultural network exists it may expand its role and act to 
mitigate opportunism in business transactions, exploiting its enhanced 
ability to regulate.136 As addressed in the next section, when networks 
have the ability to be the efficient regulators, they often reform to accept 
that role. 
B. When Are Networks Optimal Regulators? 
Below I will discuss when networks are the optimal regulators. This 
depends on the network having comparative advantages in both the 
ability to regulate and in the incentive to do so. When this is not the case, 
other potential regulators are likely to displace the network unless the 
network adapts to improve its ability and/or incentive. This adaptive 
qualification will be addressed at the end of this section. 
1. Networks’ ability to regulate 
The mechanisms that networks use to regulate—the switching 
mechanism, the exclusion mechanism, the control mechanism, and the 
information mechanism—were described above. The effectiveness of 
these mechanisms, and therefore the effectiveness of the network as a 
regulator, is dependent on the market structure. 
The effectiveness of a network’s switching mechanism is greater in 
markets that are characterized by significant network benefits and low 
concentration. As concentration rises, the market becomes more 
susceptible to collusion; the network’s prices are less likely to mimic a 
perfectly competitive market, and fewer alternative firms are available to 
contract with when a transaction fails. 
Similarly, the effectiveness of a network’s exclusion mechanism is 
greater in markets that are characterized by significant network benefits 
and low concentration. The greater the network benefits, the greater the 
value conferred on the network member, and therefore the greater the 
cost of canceling the membership in the network.137
 136. See Aviram, supra note 9. 
 137. For a similar point, see Bernstein, Private Commercial Law, supra note 30, at 111 
(“When market transactors share a common view about what constitutes acceptable business 
behaviour, a given instance of misbehaviour will result in more transactors imposing the 
sanction. . . . It gives transactors an added incentive to abide by their commercial commitments by 
making it in each transactor’s individual best-interest to perform rather than breach over a wide 
range of contingencies and market conditions.”). 
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Larger firms, however, are less threatened by exclusion. First, the 
larger the firm the greater the loss to the network from its exclusion since 
the size of the network decreases significantly and with it the network 
benefits. The network’s threat of exclusion is less credible the greater the 
loss it suffers from the exclusion. Second, some firms may be large 
enough to become indispensable to other firms, and therefore exclusion 
from the network may force those dependent members to contract with 
the excluded firm. This decreases both the volume of transactions 
processed through the network (thereby further harming network 
members) and the amount of business the excluded firm is deprived of. 
Third, as mentioned above,138 large firms may actually find it profitable 
to adopt a degradation strategy under which the firm weakens the 
network in order to gain an advantage in competing against smaller 
firms. Exclusion from the network is the ultimate form of degradation 
since it degrades to nothing the connectivity with the excluded firm and 
therefore would be a boon, not a bane, to large firms that benefit from 
degradation.139
The information mechanism is an extension of the exclusion 
mechanism and decreases in effectiveness in similar situations: private 
parties are less likely to boycott larger firms, even if provided with 
credible information by the network, because the harm from boycotting a 
larger firm tends to be greater. Specifically, large firms tend to have 
more captive partners who find it very costly to switch away from the 
large firm and are therefore less likely to do so. 
Finally, the control mechanism is also more efficient in markets that 
are characterized by significant network benefits and low 
concentration.140 The control mechanism is effective when the network’s 
transacting facilities cannot be feasibly replaced by opportunistic 
members. If the transacting facilities can be easily replaced, then the 
opportunistic members can do so immediately before behaving 
 138. See Cremer, Rey & Tirole, supra note 74 and Part III.C.2. 
 139. Some large firms do not benefit from degradation because network benefits gained from 
operating within the network outweigh the possible benefits of competing against a degraded 
network. For such firms, the third argument regarding the effectiveness of the exclusion mechanism 
would not apply, and perhaps the threat of exclusion will deter them from breach. However, the 
other two arguments (regarding the credibility of the threat to exclude and the “stranded partners” 
that cannot stop transacting with the firm) still apply and may weaken the network’s ability to 
discipline that firm’s behavior. 
 140. Some networks have a decentralized structure that does not involve centralized control of 
transacting facilities. In that case, the control mechanism will not be available regardless of network 
benefits or the size of firms in the market. 
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opportunistically (to evade the network’s ability to monitor and prevent 
the behavior) or immediately after behaving opportunistically (to null the 
effect of the network’s denial of access to the facilities). Creating 
independent transacting facilities has the same effect as being excluded 
from the network, and therefore the effects of network benefits and firm 
size on the effectiveness of the control mechanism are the same as those 
mentioned in the discussion above on the exclusion mechanism. The 
greater the network benefits conferred by the network, the larger the 
difference between it and any alternative facility created by the 
opportunistic member. In sum, networks’ ability to regulate should 
increase as network benefits rise and the size of the firms in the market 
decreases. 
2. Networks’ incentive to regulate 
Opportunism, broadly defined, is “an act in which someone destroys 
part of the cooperative surplus to secure a larger share of it.”141 
Regulation is aimed at mitigating opportunism, yet no potential regulator 
has the incentives to always deter opportunism. First-party controllers 
(self-regulators) have perhaps the least incentive to regulate efficiently 
since the regulator is also the would-be opportunist and is likely to be the 
direct beneficiary of the opportunistic behavior it is regulating. Second-
party controllers (transaction regulators) are directly affected by any 
opportunism targeted at them but do not care about the effects on others. 
Therefore, they do not have a sufficient incentive to regulate efficiently 
when opportunism imposes externalities on others. They may even 
regulate in a way that benefits them but harms others, as may be the case 
with cartels, group boycotts, etc. Government has broader incentives, 
usually extending to the interests of all its constituents. However, the 
incentives are indirect. As public-choice theory observes, the interests of 
certain constituents influence government more than others. Government 
may also have other interests besides mitigating opportunism that might 
conflict with efficient anti-opportunism enforcement.142
 141. Cooter, supra note 12, at 150. 
 142. For example, as mentioned supra note 25, the government’s interest in deterring violent 
crimes and the need to assign sanctions in proportion with their gravity require that government not 
use its most powerful sanctions against persons who act opportunistically in business transactions 
since this is considered a significantly less serious crime than murder or rape. If private parties can 
rely on the government to deter the more serious crimes, private parties will impose the strongest 
sanctions they have against less serious, but still harmful, behavior such as opportunism in business 
transactions. 
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Networks have similar incentives to those of the parties to the 
transaction. Being a larger group, the array of interests networks are 
concerned with is broader than that of transaction regulators. Unlike the 
government, the network is directly affected by opportunism, since 
opportunism usually decreases network benefits and reduces activity and 
reliance on the network. Like transaction regulators, networks may 
disregard, or even exploit, the interests of nonmembers. The literature 
has termed this “the dark side of private ordering.”143 For example, some 
networks discriminate on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, or other 
characteristics. In certain cases (typically where government regulation is 
lacking), networks utilize physical violence as a sanction.144 More 
commonly, they may attempt to create, enhance, or maintain the market 
power of their members. 
The possession of market power by a network, or the ability to 
maintain that market power, significantly biases the network’s 
incentives. The same mechanisms that are used to mitigate opportunism 
can be used to facilitate collusion. From the perspective of the network 
members, but not, of course, from the perspective of overall social 
welfare, cheating on a cartel agreement is no different from defrauding. 
Both reduce the benefits to network members, and the prevention of both 
is beneficial to the network. 
Stephen Pirrong points to other potential biases that may cause 
networks to lack the incentive to regulate in a socially efficient 
manner.145 First, collective-action problems and rent-seeking among 
network members impair incentives to self-regulate.146 Second, some 
types of opportunism mainly affect inframarginal customers of the 
network, while the network members’ wealth depends on the marginal 
customers.147 The strength of these arguments seems to be highly 
 143. See Milhaupt & West, supra note 35. Other scholars refer to this as the “downside” of 
private ordering. See Ellen D. Katz, Private Order and Public Institutions, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2481, 
2482–85 (2000); McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 35, at 2454–58. 
 144. Milhaupt & West, supra note 35, at 93 (“[I]n the absence of workable legal mechanisms, 
enforcement requires credible threats of physical violence: state coercion must be privatized.”). 
 145. Stephen Craig Pirrong, The Self-Regulation of Commodity Exchanges: The Case of 
Market Manipulation, 38 J.L. & ECON. 141, 150–64 (1995). 
 146. Id. at 157–64. 
 147. Pirrong makes two other arguments as well: (1) networks may not face significant 
competition and therefore may lack the incentive to improve efficiency in transacting through the 
network, id. at 154–55; and (2) there is a significant negative externality on nonmembers who rely 
on price information from transactions on the network, id. at 151–54. Both of these arguments suffer 
from flaws. 
The argument regarding lack of competition among networks is unconvincing because even if 
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dependent on the characteristics of the specific network. Pirrong’s focus, 
for example, was on commodity exchanges. Even in instances where 
such arguments have validity, this only means that networks are 
imperfect regulators. As seen above, the government—as well as any 
other potential regulator—suffers from imperfections in its incentives 
and ability to regulate. Networks may therefore be the most efficient 
regulators even where they suffer from some bias in their incentives. 
Furthermore, as described below,148 networks adapt to biases that 
hinder regulation by evolving through middleware into a network with 
either decentralized control or centralized control by a firm that does not 
possess market power either alone or with others in the network.149 
Typically, this is because the “hub” firm that controls the expanded 
network does not operate in the industry in which the market-power-
possessing members operate—for example, an express company in the 
hub of a network of railroads or a programming language in the hub of a 
network of operating systems, etc.150
a network faces no competition it would still view opportunism that harms its customers as a cost 
rather than a monopolistic rent (unless it profits the network itself, which would make the 
“opportunistic” action an exploitation of market power by the network rather than an opportunistic 
act done over the network). If opportunism is a cost, a monopolist would have an incentive to 
mitigate it and replace it with outright extraction of monopolistic rent as long as the cost of 
mitigation is lower than the loss of profits from the decline in demand due to this cost. However, one 
instance in which this would not be the case is where the network is regulated by government and 
limited in its ability to receive payments from its customers. In that case the monopolist would have 
no incentive to diminish opportunism. Furthermore, in the case of such regulation, to the degree that 
this opportunism is beneficial to the network members, the network might favor opportunism as a 
form of “gold plating” evasion of regulatory caps on rent extraction. But this seems not to be the 
common case with most networks.  
Regarding the reliance on price information, nonmembers should, and probably do, take into 
account the degree of opportunism policing when they decide whether and to what extent to rely on 
the network or the information it generates. If a network is the institution with the best ability to 
mitigate opportunism but lacks the incentive to self-regulate efficiently, nonmembers will seek a 
more accurate indicator, rely less on the price information, or pay the network in order to self-
regulate. 
 148. See infra Part IV.B.3. 
 149. The network possessing market power may attempt to prevent middleware from forming 
or from connecting to the network since the network benefits more from maintaining its market 
power than from enhancing regulation. 
 150. Perhaps the popularity of industry-sponsored networks in some industries, and of 
independent networks in other industries, may be explained by the need (in the latter group of 
industries) to create a network that is free of market power bias in the incentive to regulate. This 
issue may warrant significant additional attention that exceeds the scope of this Article. 
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3. Networks’ resilience: the role of middleware in making networks 
better regulators 
As noted above,151 there is a demand for efficient regulation. This 
demand allows networks to displace other institutions, such as the parties 
to the transaction or government, where the network is the more efficient 
regulator. Similarly, when networks are not efficient regulators, demand 
for regulation creates pressures to replace the ineffective network with 
other institutions. However, networks are very resilient and, in response 
to a demand for regulation, often adapt to a form that is better suited to 
mitigate opportunism. 
This adaptation often takes the form of an institution recent antitrust 
case law and literature has called “middleware.”152 Middleware is a 
facility that connects two independent networks in order to maintain 
access between those networks. It can be analogized to a hub, the spokes 
of which are independent networks and the purpose of which is to 
combine the independent spokes into a single network. 
Middleware has been discussed in depth in the context of the 
Microsoft trial.153 In that context, the middleware was software (such as 
Sun’s Java and Netscape’s Navigator) that could operate on various 
operating systems while allowing application developers to develop 
applications operating thereon. An application written for the 
middleware would then operate on any of the various operating systems 
that supported the middleware. Thus, the middleware would connect 
independent networks or operating systems, allowing one application to 
operate on all. 
Much of the discussion in the Microsoft trial and in the literature that 
analyzed middleware in the aftermath of that trial examined the effects of 
middleware on market power and market definition. Market power may 
be a cause of the demand for middleware because it biases the existing 
network’s incentive to regulate efficiently. For example, software 
application programmers may create a demand for middleware such as 
Java out of concern that if their software application cannot be used on 
several operating systems, Microsoft would extract the surplus value they 
 151. See supra Part II.A. 
 152. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000), rev’d in 
part, 253 F.3d 34, 53–54 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001); Howard A. Shelanski 
& J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2001). 
 153. Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 30. 
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create by raising the price of its operating system.154 But there may be 
other reasons for the emergence of middleware, such as limitations to the 
current networks’ ability—rather than incentive—to regulate. A key 
utility of middleware is its ability to ensure efficient connectivity 
between formerly independent networks.155
It seems that one of the benefits of the middleware discussed in the 
Microsoft trial, though certainly not the only benefit and perhaps not the 
most important one, was its ability to allow a single application to 
operate on several operating systems.156 Arguably, the market power 
possessed by Microsoft’s Windows operating system biased its incentive 
to regulate efficiently, perhaps instead giving it an incentive to attempt to 
maintain or enhance its market power by excluding or degrading. On the 
other hand, middleware such as Java or Netscape Navigator did not 
possess market power and therefore had an unbiased incentive to enforce 
norms efficiently (“norms” in this context may perhaps mean choice of 
efficient technical standards rather than technical standards that are 
suboptimal but which exclude rivals). 
Middleware may also emerge when existing networks lack the ability 
to properly regulate. This seems to have been the case, for example, with 
an older type of middleware—express companies.157 These companies 
formed in the mid-nineteenth century when traveling a significant 
distance by train required connecting through many small railroads. A 
small number of railroads operated in each region, making a regional 
network less effective as a regulator.158 Express companies took upon 
 154. If the software application can be used on several operating systems, Microsoft cannot 
extract the surplus value because if it raised the price of Windows, people would use the application 
on another operating system. For example, if a new financial planning program was worth $100 
more to every user than the next-best software of the same type and that financial planning program 
only worked on Windows, Microsoft could raise the price of Windows by $100 and users would still 
buy it since users would require Windows in order to benefit from the financial planning software. 
If, on the other hand, the financial planning software was written in Java and could be used on 
Windows as well as other operating systems, a $100 price increase in Windows would cause users to 
abandon Windows and use the financial planning software on another operating system. The 
application software writer could then raise the price of the application to capture the surplus value it 
has created. 
 155. Middleware often has other functional utilities that have nothing to do with regulation. 
For example, the internet browser serves as an interface between the user and the internet. 
 156. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 34, 53 (explaining how middleware allows an application to 
operate on several operating systems and discussing the potential competitive significance). 
 157. See Dennis W. Carlton & J. Mark Klamer, The Need for Coordination Among Firms, 
with Special Reference to Network Industries, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 446, 454–60 (1983). 
 158. As discussed supra Part IV.B.1, high concentration (i.e., a market composed of a few 
large firms) reduces a network’s ability to regulate. It is noteworthy that there was another obstacle 
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themselves to deliver freight and coordinated among the railroads that 
carried that freight. As Dennis Carlton and Mark Klamer point out, 
express companies offered this coordination until railroad companies 
consolidated and were able to offer comparable coordination.159
The resilience of networks is not without limits. As discussed 
above,160 network effects may to some extent raise barriers to entry, 
meaning some “biased” networks would not be replaced by smaller 
unbiased alternatives. However, even if proponents of inefficient lock-in 
are correct in their analysis, the barriers to entry raised by network 
effects are not infinite, and therefore biased networks’ fear of being 
replaced by nonbiased alternatives serves as a check on the degree to 
which they use their ability to regulate in a manner that is socially 
inefficient.161 Another limit to the resilience of networks stems from the 
evolutionary pattern by which they develop. The creation of PLSs is 
often not spontaneous but rather develops in phases; initially the PLS 
regulates very few, cooperative (and therefore easy to enforce) functions, 
and only later does the PLS expand to enforce more rivalrous norms.162 
Impediments to the creation of PLSs may slow the entry of network 
regulators and this delay, if it is sufficiently long, may force parties to 
enter into transaction regulation, including horizontal and vertical 
to self-coordination by the railroads due to a possible bias in incentives caused by possession of 
market power. There were not many railroads competing from any given destination, and therefore 
many of the railroad companies possessed some market power. 
 159. Carlton & Klamer, supra note 157, at 457 (“Some of the uniform operating procedures 
were spurred by outside competition. During the thirty-year period beginning in 1850, independent 
freight companies, such as Wells Fargo, began to serve as intermediaries between railroads and 
customers who desired to ship goods. These freight companies handled the complicated transactions 
with all the different railroads. . . . By the 1880’s, the railroads had little need for freight express 
companies.”). On consolidation as a response to the need for greater coordination, see ALFRED D. 
CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 81–
82, 89 (1977). 
 160. See supra note 68. 
 161. For example, even if network effects benefiting users of Microsoft Windows would allow 
Microsoft to design its operating system in a way that is suboptimal to the consumers but that 
suppresses the emergence of middleware and competing operating systems, there are limits to the 
disutility Microsoft could inflict. At some point, the disutility of the design would more than offset 
the utility of Windows’s network effects for some marginal users, and they would abandon Windows 
for a rival. This, in turn, would reduce Windows’s network effects, making other users decide to 
switch operating systems, which would reduce network effects yet again, ultimately resulting in the 
market tipping to another network. Similarly, a social network might adopt norms that are inefficient 
but exclude a certain group to the advantage of the network’s members. But if the norm is grossly 
inefficient, another group would form with more efficient norms and would be able to recruit 
members despite its disadvantage in network effects, due to the greater efficiency of its norms. 
 162. See Aviram, supra note 9. 
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integration that affects market structure. For example, excessively strict 
antitrust regulation may prohibit welfare-enhancing information 
exchanges or trade association rules that reduce opportunism. 
It is also important to note that middleware is not necessarily 
welfare-enhancing. For example, it may free ride on investments in the 
independent networks it connects. However, where network regulation 
can be efficient, but the existing network lacks the incentive or ability to 
regulate efficiently, middleware is likely to appear in response to demand 
for welfare-enhancing regulation. 
It is worthwhile to observe the dual effect that middleware has on a 
network’s ability to regulate. On one hand, as discussed at length above, 
middleware has the effect of strengthening the network’s incentive to 
regulate efficiently. Since the incumbent network is threatened by entry 
or expansion of middleware if it does not regulate efficiently, it is either 
“kept honest” by the middleware or displaced by it. On the other hand, 
middleware weakens the network’s ability to regulate as it undermines 
the exclusion mechanism; exclusion from the network does not deprive a 
member of network benefits since the middleware provides them. The 
control mechanism is also often undermined; tracking behavior on the 
network’s central facilities is not helpful if the central facility can be 
bypassed by using the middleware, especially if the middleware is more 
lenient in its enforcement or if the middleware abides by and enforces 
different norms. This dual effect makes it impossible to assess as a 
general matter whether middleware increases or reduces the ability of 
networks to regulate in a social-welfare-maximizing manner. 
C. Market Structure and Regulation 
As mentioned above, this Article offers but an initial observation, 
intended to guide future detailed empirical examination of the utilization 
of network effects in creating institutions that mitigate opportunism. This 
section takes a first step on this empirical journey with a glance at 
anecdotal evidence that supports the predictions of the theory espoused 
in this Article. 
Part III.C of this Article explained why markets with low 
concentration—i.e., containing many small firms—are prone to suffer 
from the breach type of opportunism, while markets with high 
concentration and high vulnerability variance are likely to suffer from 
degradation. Part IV.B observed that, given the incentive to do so, 
networks are likely to be efficient regulators in markets characterized by 
significant network benefits and low concentration. 
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A very brief and preliminary look at a few network industries seems 
to support these expectations. The diamond exchange industry, the cotton 
exchange industry, and internet auction websites all involve many 
relatively small firms and significant network benefits. It seems the main 
opportunistic threats these industries are concerned with are of the breach 
type, i.e., primarily fraud and insolvency. In these circumstances, we 
would expect networks to be good regulators. In fact, networks do indeed 
take active roles in monitoring, deterring, and punishing breach in each 
of these industries.163 Government regulation is not as intensive; none of 
these industries is closely regulated, and though the FTC is active in 
prosecuting internet fraud, the larger internet websites, such as eBay, 
take a leading role in instituting antifraud mechanisms.164
On the other hand, the internet backbone industry and the credit card 
industry (in certain countries) tend to be dominated (in each relevant 
geographic market) by a few large firms. In many regions, the pre-
regulation (i.e., nineteenth-century) American rail industry was likewise 
dominated by a few large firms.165 In these industries, we would expect 
degradation, rather than breach, to be the primary concern.166 
Consequently, we would expect networks to be poor regulators and 
networks should therefore be less prevalent in these industries than 
collections of bilateral or small multilateral connections, which can be 
governed by transaction regulation.167 The framework discussed in this 
Article would also predict that these industries would be less resistant to 
government regulation since government regulation would be more 
effective than the network counterpart. Indeed, all these industries are in 
fact regulated by government and, at least in the rail industry, scholars 
 163. See Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 30 (diamond industry); Bernstein, supra note 39 
(cotton industry); Snyder, supra note 96 (internet auction websites). 
 164. See Snyder, supra note 96. 
 165. The nineteenth-century rail industry is examined, rather than the contemporary one, 
because regulation, which was significantly increased in the late nineteenth century and early 
twentieth century, affects the industry structure. The industry structure observed in a regulated 
industry may have more to do with a regulator’s presence and preferences than with private ordering. 
 166. See, e.g., Cremer, Rey & Tirole, supra note 74 (regarding degradation concerns in the 
internet backbone industry). 
 167. For a discussion of the circumstances in which transaction regulation is preferable to 
network regulation in the context of the natural gas industry, see Thomas P. Lyon & Steven C. 
Hackett, Bottlenecks and Governance Structures: Open Access and Long-term Contracting in 
Natural Gas, 9 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 380, 384–85 (1993). 
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indicate that government regulation was actually welcomed by the 
railroad companies.168
V. CONCLUSION 
The vast majority of private legal systems examined by the private-
ordering literature are networks—institutions that facilitate network 
effects. This is no accident; network effects are powerful norm-enforcing 
tools. This Article examines the implications of network effects on 
private ordering. First, it identifies norm-enforcement mechanisms that 
take advantage of network effects and that are therefore used by 
networks to regulate. Second, it identifies a type of norm violation 
strategy called degradation that has yet to be explored by the private-
ordering literature and that is facilitated by network effects. Third, it 
determines the market structure characteristics that are conducive to the 
efficient operation of the enforcement mechanisms, as well as the market 
structure characteristics that are conducive to degradation. Combining 
these together reveals the market structure most favorable to the 
regulatory abilities of networks. Primarily, these market characteristics 
are a high level of network effects and low concentration in the market in 
which the network members operate. Unsurprisingly, these are the same 
prevailing market characteristics in many (if not most) PLSs described in 
the private-ordering literature. 
Networks employ four mechanisms to decrease opportunism: an 
information mechanism (collection and dissemination of information on 
the credibility of firms in order to facilitate independent decisions on the 
feasibility of transacting), an exclusion mechanism (depriving a member 
of access to the network), a control mechanism (centralized control of 
transacting facilities and other members’ assets), and a switching 
mechanism (efficient replacement of failed transactions with alternative 
ones). 
Network effects do not only assist in enforcing norms. They also 
induce a special type of norm violation, called degradation. Degradation 
is a predatory act that weakens the network, which harms smaller firms 
more than larger ones, thereby giving larger firms an advantage over 
 168. See GABRIEL KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION 1877–1916, at 3 (1965) (“Indeed, 
the railroads, not the farmers and shippers, were the most important single advocates of federal 
regulation from 1877 to 1916. Even when they frequently disagreed with the details of specific 
legislation, they always supported the principle of federal regulation as such.”); SUSAN PERVIANT 
LEE & PETER PASSELL, A NEW ECONOMIC VIEW OF AMERICAN HISTORY 324–25 (1979); PAUL 
MACAVOY, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF REGULATION (1965). 
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smaller competitors. Market structure and the number and relative size of 
network members affect the likelihood that a network will suffer from 
degradation. Markets containing a few large firms with a high variance in 
their individual vulnerabilities are particularly susceptible to degradation. 
When degradation is a feasible strategy for a network member, it is 
difficult for a regulator to deter it. Both private and public regulators 
have problems distinguishing harmful degradation from efficient 
reduction in network connectivity. Private regulators, including 
networks, are also hindered in their ability to punish degrading parties 
because their enforcement mechanisms tend to be least effective in 
conditions that are most conducive to degradation. Thus, parties often 
turn to the public legal system to remedy degradation.
